To fully appreciate the significance of the second German summer campaign in Russia, it is necessary to recall the aims of the first summer campaign. As we have seen, they did not consist in conquering all of Russia, but in attacking the main strategic regions to force the Russian armies to defend them and lose defenders in subsequent battles. The strategic goal was tactical extermination.
We also saw that this strategy failed because the speed of advance was slow, the space too large, and the resistance too strong.
If the crushing strategy failed under the more favorable conditions of 1941, how could it succeed under the less favorable conditions of 1942? Hitler answered this question in the negative; and it would be foolish to resort to it again. Instead of a strategy of crushing, a strategy of attrition should have been used. However, there was no question of solving this problem by tactical attrition; even if it were possible, such a course of action would take too much time. Stirring up a revolution against the Bolsheviks was also out of the question. Consequently, the only possibility remained: to undermine the economic power of Russia, to strike at the material basis of its armed forces. It was decided that for this it was necessary to deprive Russia of the Donetsk industrial region, the Kuban granary and Caucasian oil. In short, to deprive Russia of important strategic areas in the quadrangle Kharkov, Stalingrad, Baku, Batumi, which would eventually put the Russian army out of action.

So, Hitler's plan for 1942, apparently, was as follows: cut off and occupy the Voronezh, Saratov, Stalingrad, Rostov quadrangle with an offensive in two parallel directions: in the north along the Kursk-Saratov line and in the south along the Taganrog-Stalingrad line. Under the cover of this blockade, pass through the Caucasus to Baku.
According to two historians, the existence of such a plan is "confirmed by a document that fell into the hands of the Russians and was mentioned by Prime Minister Stalin in a speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution." The document outlined the procedure for the occupation of the following cities: Borisoglebsk, eastern Voronezh, by July 10, Stalingrad by July 25, Saratov by August 10, Syzran by August 15, Arzamas, south of Gorky, by September 10.
Surprising is the very rapidity of the planned occupation of the cities, but even more surprising is what should be clear even to a novice in strategy: the success of the campaign depended not so much on the capture of important points, but on how much retaliatory action from the Russians could be prevented. As can be seen from the plan, the Russian armies located north of the Voronezh-Saratov line were ignored. Given the space of Russia and the strength of the Russian armies, it was obvious that they could not be exterminated tactically, just as it was impossible to break the Russian people due to their high moral stamina. Therefore, success could only be achieved by strategically paralyzing them, but not by depriving the Russians of the resources needed in the future, such as oil, coal and wheat, should be deprived of the possibility of movement. Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to occupy or besiege Moscow. Just as Paris is the central junction of French railways, so Moscow is the central junction of Russian railways. In 1914, due to the fact that the Germans did not occupy Paris, there was a disaster on the Marne. In 1942, as we shall see below, a failure near Moscow led to a catastrophe on the Volga. If Moscow were in the hands of the Germans, then the constant strategic bombing of Vologda, Bui, Gorky, Arzamas and Penza, located at a distance of 250-350 miles from Moscow and, therefore, easily accessible to bombers, would not only stop the supply of supplies from Arkhangelsk and reserves from the Asian part of Russia, but also lead to a chaotic state of traffic on the railways in the central part of Russia, and maybe stop all traffic.

The armies that were to carry out Hitler's plan were commanded by Field Marshal von Bock. The morale and training of the armies were lower than in 1941, but the firepower had increased. The bulky Panzer Division of 400 tanks was reduced to 250 improved tanks, the air force organized into strike groups that interacted more closely with the ground forces than before. The Germans adopted a new tank tactic that Field Marshal Rommel is credited with creating. It was called “motpulk” and, in essence, was a modernized copy of the Hussite mobile camp. Colonel de Waterville describes her as follows:
“The mass of mobile assets was located in such a way that tanks and self-propelled artillery were an external contour, inside which a vulnerable center was placed: infantry in vehicles, anti-tank artillery, mobile repair shops and all the modern equipment needed by the army in battle ... First of all, it was a combat an organism with enormous firepower, extremely agile and covered in thick armor...”
The main German offensive did not begin until June 28, but important battles preceded it. On May 8, Field Marshal von Manstein, who commanded the German 12th Army in the Crimea, launched an attack on Kerch and took the city by storm on May 13. As this battle drew to a close, on May 12, Marshal Timoshenko, in order to delay the German advance, launched a heavy blow south of Kharkov. Rapidly advancing from Lozovaya in the direction of Kharkov and Poltava, on May 16, Russian troops occupied Krasnograd and broke through the outer defense belt of the "overhead" (Kharkov) and two days later started fighting on the outskirts of the city. On May 19, the Germans launched a counteroffensive with large forces. After heavy fighting in the Barvenkovo ​​region, Izyum, Marshal Timoshenko was forced to leave Krasnograd. During the retreat, a significant part of his troops was surrounded and taken prisoner. On June 1, the Germans announced a complete victory, but for them this offensive was an unpleasant event.
Four days later, von Manstein began the bombardment of Sevastopol, preparing to storm the fortress. The outer defensive belt of the fortress was 20 miles long, while the inner one was 8 miles long. The fortress was defended by a garrison of 75 thousand people under the command of General Petrov. On July 1, after a fierce battle, during which 50 thousand tons of artillery shells were fired at the fortress and 25 thousand tons of bombs were dropped, Sevastopol was taken by storm. Thus, the entire Crimea was in the hands of the Germans.
By mid-June, the concentration of German troops on the winter front line west of the Oskol River left the Russians in no doubt that a powerful offensive was being prepared. Von Bock pulled up the following forces here: in the Kursk region - the 2nd Army, the 2nd Panzer Army and the Hungarian Army, all under the command of General von Weich; in the Belgorod area - the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army under the command of General von Goth; to the Kharkov region, the 17th Army and the 1st Panzer Army under the command of Field Marshal von Kleist; the Italian army remained in reserve west of Kharkov. South of this army group was General Schwedler's group, which was to be placed at the disposal of Field Marshal von Manstein's 12th Army; the latter, together with the Romanian army, was transferred from the Crimea in the near future.
The Russians assumed that the German offensive would begin on the Voronezh-Rostov front and would develop along the Saratov-Stalingrad line, so they concentrated a strong grouping north of Voronezh and well fortified the Voronezh and Rostov regions, as well as the line of the Donets River.
On June 22, the Germans suddenly struck from the Izyum region and three days later drove the Russians out of Kupyansk. This was followed on June 28 by the long-awaited offensive, which began with a strike east of Kursk. On July 1, the Russian front between Shchigry and Tim was broken through. On July 2, the Germans went on the offensive with large forces between Belgorod and Kharkov. Again, the Russian front was broken through, and by July 5 the Germans reached the western outskirts of Voronezh in the north and the Svatovo-Lysichansk line in the south.
The battle for Voronezh began, and, as we shall see, for the Germans it was one of the most fatal during the entire war.
On July 6 and 7, von Weich's tanks and motorized infantry crossed the Don and broke into Voronezh, which is located in the corner formed by the Don and a small tributary, so that the city is surrounded on three sides by a water barrier. The German infantry, which entered the battle, was attacked from the flank between the rivers. “Russian troops concentrated... north of Voronezh arrived in time to save the day, they may have saved the Russians the whole campaign” .
There is no doubt that this was the case. Over the next ten days, while fierce fighting was going on in the city, the offensive south of Voronezh developed with great speed. Comparing it to the Russian resistance in Voronezh itself had a strange psychological effect on Hitler.
By July 12, von Goth took Rossosh and Kantemirovka - stations on the Voronezh-Rostov railway, the next day von Kleist's 1st Panzer Army occupied Millerovo. Voroshilovgrad was outflanked and occupied on 20 July. Meanwhile, von Manstein's armies were moving on Rostov, which the Russians evacuated on 27 July.
“The entire Russian front was falling apart... the German army crossed the Don on a broad front. The tone of the Russian communiqués became serious, and growing concern was felt in the radio broadcasts ... There were insistent demands in Russia to open a second front”
The rapid advance towards Stalingrad and the unexpected resistance of the Russians at Voronezh apparently prompted Hitler's decision to leave a barrier in Voronezh from the von Weichs Army Group, and send the von Hoth group directly to the east to act in conjunction with von Manstein against Stalingrad. Only after the fall of Stalingrad was the offensive against Saratov to be resumed.
From a strategic point of view, this mistake borders on insanity. Since no attempt was made to disable the Moscow railway junction, the Russian armies north of Voronezh had complete freedom of movement. The occupation of the Caucasus was main goal German plan. This could be done only in this way: to create a deep defensive area to the north of the Caucasus, that is, as envisaged by the original plan, to occupy the quadrangle of Rostov, Stalingrad, Saratov, Voronezh, which was caused by the need to ensure the depth of defense and space for maneuvering. Having occupied not a quadrangle, but a triangle of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, the Germans formed a wedge. The northern side of the wedge - the line Voronezh, Stalingrad - was open to the Russian offensive in a southerly direction from the line Voronezh, Saratov. The change in line of operations thus prepared the final defeat.
In accordance with the changed plan, von Weichs' armies dug in at Voronezh. Hungarian, Italian and Romanian divisions were used to protect von Hoth's strategic flank along the western bank of the Don. Meanwhile, von Manstein's group, advancing from Rostov, crossed the Don in the lower reaches of Tsimlyanskaya, while von Kleist rushed south to the plains of the North Caucasus.
During the last week of July and the first week of August, von Hoth's troops quickly descended down the Don, and a fierce struggle broke out for bridgeheads at Kletskaya and Kalach, where the Don turns south west of Stalingrad. On August 15, the crossing near Kalach was captured, but only on August 25 was the river forced at Kletskaya. German troops advancing south of the Don were stopped at Kotelnikovo. Only after forcing the river by the troops of General von Goth were they able to continue the offensive. On September 9, the Stalingrad-Borisoglebsk railway was cut, and Stalingrad was heavily bombarded from the air. It seemed to the Germans that the city would soon fall.
While the operations were unfolding in this way, von Kleist's group, which crossed the lower Don, quickly spread over the steppes of the North Caucasus. On August 4, Voroshilovsk fell, on August 8 the Russians destroyed and abandoned the Maikop oil fields, on August 20 Krasnodar was occupied, on August 25 German troops reached Mozdok in the middle reaches of the Terek, 100 miles from the Caspian Sea; The Russians retreated to Grozny. Finally, on September 10, the naval base on the Black Sea, Novorossiysk, fell. Due to difficult terrain, Russian resistance, sprawling communications, and lack of fuel, the Caucasian campaign effectively ended there. Everything was thrown at the capture of Stalingrad. Stalingrad (formerly Tsaritsyn) was a large, sprawling industrial city with a population of about 500,000; it stands on the right bank of the Volga, a few miles above its bend. The advance of the Germans on the city was hampered by the fact that the Volga here has a width of 2 - 2.5 miles and, therefore, is difficult to cross. The city could not be completely surrounded without crossing the river.
The Germans faced the problem of gaining a foothold on the left bank of the Volga. Then a relatively small army could stop all movement along the river and force the garrison of Stalingrad to leave the city by blockade.
With any crossing of the river with a fight, the determining factor is not at all the width of the river, although this is important, but the width of the front of the attacker. If the front is wide, by false attempts to cross in several places, the attackers will divert the attention of the enemy, build a bridge on some undefended or weakly defended sector of the enemy’s defense and create a bridgehead. A wide river, such as the Volga, takes longer to cross than a narrow one, so the front for diverting operations must be wider. The Germans first of all had to create such a front. However, they did not do this, but resorted to a direct blow, trying to take the city by bombardment and storm.

The assault began on 15 September. For a whole month, attack followed attack, but the garrison under the command of General Chuikov put up strong resistance, and the Germans were able to achieve only local, or temporary, successes. The extreme idiocy of such a course of action should have become apparent as soon as it became clear that the city could not be taken on the move. The city is not a fortress, but as long as the garrison holds out and its supply lines are in place, turning a city into a heap of rubble is nothing short of the easiest way to create an obstacle that stronger than anyone from specially built fortresses.
The losses of the German troops in the senseless assaults were so heavy that on October 15, General Goth received an order to stop the attacks and wipe Stalingrad from the face of the earth with systematic artillery fire and air bombardment. For what? Only one answer is possible: to support the prestige of Hitler, for the city was already in ruins. The industry of Stalingrad was destroyed, the Volga was intercepted, the movement of transports up and down the Volga was suspended. Delivery of oil from Baku to Moscow stopped. Consequently, now it only remained to keep the river blocked, the city itself was tactically of no value.
Thus the Germans lost control of the offensive in Russia, and at the same time they were increasingly losing it in North Africa. Many factors create and maintain initiative, but the main factor is to ensure freedom of movement for oneself or, on the contrary, limit this freedom for the enemy. Both in North Africa and in Stalingrad, essentially throughout Russia, there was one common, all-determining factor - the excessive stretching of German communications, plus the difficulties associated with protecting them.
From Egypt, Rommel's communications stretched 1,200 miles to Tripoli and another 1,300 miles in a straight line to the industrial cities of Germany, which supplied his armies. The length of Gotha's communications through Russia was 1000 miles and through Germany to the central regions - 600 miles. In the first case, as long as the British held Malta firmly, they could operate against the lines of communication of Rommel's army; in the second case, while the Russians held Moscow, they had freedom of maneuver against von Hoth's troops, while the Russian partisan detachments forced the Germans to protect every mile of their communications and, consequently, diverted hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the front.
Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1942, Russia's economic situation was desperate, and, were it not for the constant influx of Anglo-American materials through Arkhangelsk, it is doubtful that the Russians would have been able to take advantage of the ridiculous position in which Hitler had placed his armies.
Since June 6, 1941, as a result of the German occupation, the population under the rule of the Soviet government has decreased from 184 million to 126 million, that is, by more than 30%. Russia suffered huge economic losses. Was lost: food resources - 38%, coal and electricity - 50%, iron and steel - 60%, manganese and aluminum - 50%, chemical industry - 33%.
Therefore, the basic idea of ​​Hitler's strategic plan was correct: to strike at the Russian economy, the basis of its military power. Error after error was made in the implementation of the plan. The size of Russia made it impossible to force the enemy into a general battle; Hitler did not understand that first you need to deprive the enemy of mobility and only then occupy important strategic areas. Russians could be deprived of mobility by occupying the center of Russian communications - Moscow. Instead, Hitler, like Charles XII and in more than Napoleon lost the initiative.
After the great victory at Poltava in 1709, Peter the Great entered Kyiv. A prayer service was served in the Hagia Sophia. The Russian priest Feofan Prokopovich, addressing the tsar and his soldiers, said: “Our neighbors and neighbors will know and say: as if not into our land, but into a certain sea, the forces of the Swane ascended, plunged like tin into the water, and the messenger from them will not return to their homeland” .
This is the secret of Russian power, which Hitler did not take into account in his strategy. It could be undermined only by depriving the Russian armies of mobility, then the space of Russia would turn for them from an ally into a mortal enemy.

A source of information:
Book: World War II. 1939-1945. Strategic and tactical review

MAIN BATTLE Winter campaign of 1942-1943 Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943) Summer-autumn campaign of 1943 Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943) the second half of 1943 on the banks of the Dnieper.

Battle of Stalingrad By the middle of summer 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga. In the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea), the German command also includes Stalingrad. Germany's goal was to take over an industrial city, the enterprises in which produced military products that were needed; gaining access to the Volga, from where it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil needed for the front was extracted. Hitler wanted to carry out this plan in just a week with the help of the 6th Paulus Field Army. It included 13 divisions, where there were about 270,000 people. , 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks. From the side of the USSR, the forces of Germany were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov). The difficulty also lay in the fact that our side experienced a shortage of ammunition.

The beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad can be considered July 17, when near the rivers Chir and Tsimla, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with detachments of the 6th German army. Throughout the second half of the summer, fierce battles were going on near Stalingrad. Further, the chronicle of events developed as follows. August 23, 1942 german tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, fascist aviation began to systematically bomb the city. On the ground, battles did not stop either. It was simply impossible to live in the city - you had to fight to win. 75 thousand people volunteered for the front. But in the city itself, people worked day and night. By mid-September, the German army broke through to the city center, the battles went right on the streets. The Nazis stepped up their attack more and more. Almost 500 tanks took part in the assault on Stalingrad, German aircraft dropped about 1 million bombs on the city. The courage of the Stalingraders was unparalleled. Many European countries were conquered by the Germans. Sometimes they needed only 2 3 weeks to capture the whole country. In Stalingrad, the situation was different. It took the Nazis weeks to capture one house, one street.

In the battles passed the beginning of autumn, mid-November. By November, almost the entire city, despite resistance, was captured by the Germans. Only a small strip of land on the banks of the Volga was still held by our troops. But it was still too early to announce the capture of Stalingrad, as Hitler did. The Germans did not know that the Soviet command already had a plan for the defeat of the German troops, which began to be developed even in the midst of the fighting, on September 12th. The development of the offensive operation "Uranus" was carried out by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. Within 2 months, in conditions of increased secrecy, a strike force was created near Stalingrad. The Nazis were aware of the weakness of their flanks, but did not assume that the Soviet command would be able to gather the required number of troops.

Further, the history of the Battle of Stalingrad was as follows: on November 19, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General N.F. Vatutin and the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive. They managed to surround the enemy, despite the resistance. Also during the offensive, five enemy divisions were captured and defeated. During the week from November 23, the efforts of the Soviet troops were directed to strengthening the blockade around the enemy. In order to remove this blockade, the German command formed the Don Army Group (commander - Field Marshal Manstein), however, it was also defeated. The destruction of the encircled grouping of the enemy army was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commander - General K.K. Rokossovsky). Since the German command rejected the ultimatum to end resistance, the Soviet troops proceeded to destroy the enemy, which was the last of the main stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. February 1943, the last enemy grouping was liquidated, which is considered the end date of the battle. 2

Results of the Battle of Stalingrad: Losses in Battle of Stalingrad on each side amounted to about 2 million people. The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad can hardly be overestimated. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad had big influence for the course of World War II. She stepped up the fight against the Nazis in all European countries. As a result of this victory, the German side ceased to dominate. The outcome of this battle caused confusion in the Axis (Hitler's coalition). There was a crisis of pro-fascist regimes in European countries.

The Kursk Salient In the spring of 1943, a relative calm settled on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased the production of military equipment at the expense of the resources of all of Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. A lot of work was done to strengthen the Soviet army. Design bureaus improved and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized corps. Aviation technology was improved, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing - after the Stalingrad

Stalin and Stavka initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. However, marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky managed to predict the place and time of the future offensive of the Wehrmacht. The Germans, having lost the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having brought together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the ledge of the front line, which was formed in the Kursk region. With the victory in this operation, Hitler planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor. Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the location of the concentration of troops and their number. The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2,000 tanks, and 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.

Zhukov proposed not to preempt the enemy's attack with his offensive, but, having organized a defense in depth, to meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft were concentrated. Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank attack of the entire war on the formations of the Red Army. Methodically breaking into the defense, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10-35 km in the first days of the fighting. At certain moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment, fresh units of the Steppe Front struck.

The battle near Prokhorovka was the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation that went down in history as the Battle of Kursk, which was decisive in ensuring a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The events of those days unfolded as follows. The Nazi command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in their favor. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943, codenamed "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the German fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk ledge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy strike groups. Thus, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.

On July 12, 1943, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a Soviet counterattack (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army). Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the operational line Yakovlevo - Oboyan. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and the Kempf Army Group went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, to the positions of the 6th and 7th Guards armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized division. On July 6, the advancing Germans were dealt two counterattacks from railway Kursk - Belgorod with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki area (northern) - Kalinin with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repulsed by the forces of the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

To assist Katukov's 1st Panzer Army, which was fighting heavy battles in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 11 p.m. on July 7, Front Commander Nikolai Vatutin signed Directive No. 0014/op on readiness for the transition to active operations from 10:30 a.m. on the 8th. However, the counterattack inflicted by the forces of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the brigades of the 1st TA, did not bring tangible results. Without achieving decisive success - by this moment the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyansky direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the tip of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psyol River .

The change in the direction of the strike was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the outnumbered Soviet tank reserves. In the event that the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the approach of the Soviet tank reserves, it was supposed to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive in order to use the terrain that was favorable for themselves, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantages by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

By July 11, the Germans took up their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", equipped better than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not attack in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" providing its flanks fought active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" covering the left flank "expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psyol River, having managed to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of their attack through the defile).

By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army had concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defenses at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The area of ​​concentration of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovka direction.

On the other hand, the choice of the specified area for the concentration of two guard armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the most powerful enemy grouping (2 m SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defending this direction of the 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be delivered by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack, the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Against the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte SS division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of 11 July. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 5 pm, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades. At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle Soviet tankmen received some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. high density the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tankers got the opportunity to accurately hit the most vulnerable places of heavily armored German vehicles. To the south of the main battle, the German tank group "Kempf" was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping on the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction. At about 13:00, the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the Totenkopf Division, attacked the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to help them, and the attack was repulsed. By 2 p.m., the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy to the west. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

The battle for the Dnieper of the Soviet troops in Ukraine in August - December 1943 was carried out with the aim of liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine, Northern Tavria, Donbass and Kyiv, as well as creating strong footholds on the right bank of the Dnieper. After the defeat at Kursk, the German command developed the Wotan defense plan. It provided for the creation of a well-fortified Eastern Wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which ran along the Narva-Pskov-Gomel line and further along the Dnieper.

This line was, according to the plan of the German leadership, to stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west. The main core of the defenders of the Dnieper part of the "Eastern Wall" in Ukraine were units of the Army Group "South" (Field Marshal E. Manstein). The troops of the Central (General K. K. Rokossovsky), Voronezh (General N. F. Vatutin), Stepnoy (General I. S. Konev), South Western (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and Southern (General F. I. Tolbukhin) fronts. The balance of forces at the beginning of the battle for the Dnieper is given in the table. Soviet troops German troops Personnel, thousand 2633 1240 Guns and mortars 51200 12600 Tanks 2400 2100 Aircraft 2850 2000

The battle for the Dnieper consisted of two stages. At the first stage (in August - September), the Red Army units liberated the Donbass, Left-bank Ukraine, crossed the Dnieper on the move and captured a number of bridgeheads on its right bank. The battle for the Dnieper began on August 26 with the Chernigov-Poltava operation (August 26 - September 30), in which the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts participated. It took place simultaneously with the Donbass operation. The troops of the Central Front were the first to go on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 60th Army (General I. D. Chernyakhovsky), who managed to break through the German defenses in a secondary sector, south of Sevsk. The front commander, General Rokossovsky, promptly reacted to this success and, having regrouped his forces, threw the main shock units of the front into the gap. This decision turned out to be a major strategic win. Already on August 31, the troops of the Central Front managed to expand the Breakthrough to a width of up to 100 km and a depth of up to 60 km, forcing the Germans to begin withdrawing troops to the Desna and Dnieper. Meanwhile, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts joined the offensive.

In early September, the offensive of the Red Army unfolded throughout the Left Bank Ukraine, which completely deprived the German command of the ability to maneuver reserves. Under these conditions, it began the withdrawal of its troops across the Dnieper. In pursuit of the retreating, the advanced units of the Red Army reached the Dnieper on the 750-kilometer section from Loev to Zaporizhia and immediately began forcing this water barrier. By the end of September, on this strip, Soviet troops captured 20 bridgeheads on the right bank. The calculations of the German leadership for a long-term defense of the Left Bank were frustrated. In October - December, the second stage of the battle began, when a fierce struggle was fought to expand and hold bridgeheads. At the same time, reserves were being brought up, bridges were being built, and forces were being built up for a new strike. During this period, the troops operating in Ukraine became part of the four Ukrainian fronts formed on October 20. At this stage, the Red Army carried out two strategic operations: Nizhnedneprovsk and Kyiv.

The Lower Dnieper operation (September 26 - December 20) was carried out by the troops of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian), Southwestern (3rd Ukrainian) and Southern (4th Ukrainian) fronts. During the operation, they liberated Northern Tavria, blockaded the Crimean peninsula and captured the largest bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper from Cherkasy to Zaporozhye (450 km long and up to 100 km deep). However, their attempts to break through from this bridgehead into the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were stopped by mid-December by the fierce resistance of the German units, which received reinforcements from the West and other regions of Ukraine. The Nizhnedneprovsk operation was notable for the large losses of the Red Army, which amounted to 754 thousand people. (about half of all losses of Soviet troops in the battles for Ukraine from August to December 1943).

The Kiev operation (October 12 - December 23) of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front was also difficult. It began with battles north and south of Kyiv for the Lyutezhsky and Bukrinsky bridgeheads. Initially, the Soviet command planned to attack Kyiv from the south, from the Bukrin area. However, the rugged terrain prevented the advance of the troops, especially the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P.S. Rybalko. Then this army was secretly transferred to the Lyutezh bridgehead, from where it was decided to deliver the main blow. On November 3, 1943, Soviet troops launched an offensive north of Kyiv, which was liberated on November 6. The Germans failed to gain a foothold on the Dnieper line. Their front was broken through, and Soviet mobile formations liberated Zhytomyr on November 13. Despite the German counterattack in the area, Manstein failed to recapture Kyiv (see Kiev operation).

By the end of 1943, the battle for the Dnieper was over. By that time, the Eastern Wall in the Ukraine had been broken through almost along its entire length. Soviet troops captured two large strategic bridgeheads (from Kyiv to Pripyat and from Cherkasy to Zaporozhye) and dozens of operational tactical bridgeheads. The hopes of the Wehrmacht command to give their troops the opportunity to rest and regroup forces at the “winter line” under the protection of a large water barrier turned out to be unrealizable. The battle for the Dnieper became a rare example in the history of wars of such a large-scale and rapid forcing of such a wide water barrier against the fierce resistance of large enemy forces. According to the German general von Butlar, during this offensive, "the Russian army demonstrated its high fighting qualities and showed that it had not only significant human resources, but also excellent military equipment" . The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to the breakthrough of the Eastern Wall is evidenced by the fact that 2438 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper (20% of the total number of those awarded this title for the war). The losses of Soviet troops during the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine with Kiev, Donbass, Northern Tavria, as well as the struggle in the bridgeheads, exceeded 1.5 million people. (including irrevocable - 373 thousand people), about 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (without the Kiev defensive operation), about 1.2 thousand aircraft (without the Kiev defensive operation).

The General Staff, headed by B.M. Shaposhnikov proposed to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the summer campaign of 1942 a plan for deep defense, since the main combat units of the Red Army were around Moscow in the process of reorganization and replenishment. In addition, in the spring of 1942, near Leningrad, near the village of Lyuban, the 2nd Shock Soviet Army was defeated, and its commander, Lieutenant General A. Vlasov, surrendered. However, I. Stalin, despite these unfavorable conditions, insisted on conducting major offensive operations of the Red Army. In April 1942, in the Crimea in the Kerch region, as a result of the inept actions of the front commander D.T. Kozlov and member of the Military Council of the Front L.Z. Mehlis, the offensive of our troops ended in defeat: the total losses amounted to about 200 thousand people. July 4 had to leave Sevastopol, heroically defending 8 months.

In May 1942, near Kharkov, the troops of the Southwestern Front (S.K. Timoshenko and N.S. Khrushchev), without prior preparation and in the absence of reserves, went on the offensive, but were surrounded by enemy troops and lost 18-20 divisions. The initiative in the fighting passed to the German troops. In June 1942, they occupied the Donbass and Rostov-on-Don, broke through the front of the Red Army in the bend of the Don, and continued to advance on Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. There were no defensive structures on the outskirts of Stalingrad, so German tank columns soon appeared on the outskirts of the city, and in the North Caucasus they reached the Main Caucasian Range.

On July 28, 1942, I. Stalin issued Order No. 227 “Not a Step Back!”, which introduced severe punishments for commanders and commissars who allowed their units to retreat without command orders: they were declared enemies of the Motherland and brought to trial by a military tribunal. In addition, penal companies were also formed, where ordinary soldiers and junior commanders were sent, "guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability ...". In the rear of some divisions, armed barrage detachments began to be located and they were obliged "in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot." The detachments were canceled only on November 13, 1944, however, the punitive body of counterintelligence "SMERSH" ("death to spies") continued to operate with unlimited powers.

At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the fascist command transferred an additional 80 divisions and a lot of military equipment to the Eastern Front in order to cut off the Volga region and the Caucasus from the center of Russia and take Moscow by a detour. The Nazi troops included Austrian, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian units, while Finnish troops blocked Leningrad from the north.

On July 17, 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad began, which lasted 200 days until February 2, 1943; Direct battles on the streets of Stalingrad unfolded on September 12, 1942. The defense of the city was held by the 62nd army of V.I. Chuikov, the 64th army of M.S. Shumilova and the 13th Youth Rifle Division A.I. Rodimtsev, almost the entire composition of which died in stubborn battles for every house.

The general leadership of our troops on the Volga was headed by representatives of the Headquarters, Marshals G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky and N.N. Voronov. According to the Uranus plan, on November 19, 1942, the Red Army went on the offensive with the forces of three fronts: the South-Western (N.F. Vatutin), the Don (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (A.I. Eremenko). On November 23, 1942, the 330,000-strong Nazi group was surrounded, but did not capitulate, hoping for outside help. December 24, 1942 the tank corps of General V.M. Bogdanov, behind enemy lines, defeated the airfield near the village of Tatsinskaya, from where the grouping of Field Marshal F. Paulus was supplied by air. Tankers destroyed 430 Nazi aircraft.

January 10, 1943, following the "Ring" plan, the Red Army began the defeat of the encircled enemy group in Stalingrad. The attempts of Manstein's army group to release the Nazis who were surrounded from the west ended in failure, and the enemy troops were thrown back to the west by 170 - 250 km. Successfully advancing in the direction of Rostov-on-Don, the Red Army cut off the fascist troops operating in the North Caucasus, and they retreated to the Crimea.

During the period of fighting on the Volga, the enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured, lost 3.5 thousand tanks, 12 thousand guns, 75 thousand vehicles and 3 thousand aircraft. In Stalingrad alone, 91,000 Nazis were taken prisoner, including 2,500 officers and 24 generals, led by Field Marshal F. Paulus. Hitler declared 3 days of mourning throughout Germany. The military power and prestige of Germany were undermined, the initiative in hostilities passed to the Red Army, a radical change began in the course of the Great Patriotic War in favor of the USSR.

After the defeat of the fascist troops on the Volga, the Red Army launched a general strategic offensive, which continued until the end of March 1943. During this time, the enemy troops were driven back 600 - 700 km. This made it possible for the troops of the Leningrad (L.A. Govorov) and Volkhov (K.A. Meretskov) fronts in January 1943 to break through the blockade of Leningrad.

The success of the Red Army was largely determined by the valor of the home front workers, who in 1942 produced 25.4 thousand aircraft, 24.5 thousand tanks, 33.1 thousand guns, while Germany during this time produced only 14 thousand aircraft, 6 , 1 thousand tanks, 14 thousand guns, and almost all of Europe conquered by it worked for Nazi Germany.

graduate work

1.1 The plans of the Nazi military command

On the eve of the second year of the Great Patriotic War, the situation of the Soviet Union remained difficult. His material and human losses were enormous, and the territories occupied by the enemy were extensive. However, the blitzkrieg strategy Nazi Germany collapsed against the USSR. In a grandiose armed confrontation on the outskirts of Moscow, the Red Army troops defeated the main grouping of the Wehrmacht and threw it back from the Soviet capital. The battle near Moscow has not yet finally decided the outcome of the struggle in favor of the USSR, but it became the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Patriotic and Second World Wars.

According to the plans of the German command, the forty-second year was to be a decisive year in the war, because Hitler was sure that the United States and England would not undertake the landing of their troops in Europe this year, he still had his hands untied for operations in the east.

However, the defeat near Moscow, the losses of the summer of forty-one, inflicted by the Red Army on the invaders, could not but affect. Despite the fact that by the spring of the forty-second year, the Nazi army had increased in numbers, received significant technical equipment, the German command did not find the strength to attack along the entire front.

“At the end of 1941, 9500 thousand were under arms in the Nazi army, and in 1942 already 10204 thousand” Morozov V.P. The historical feat of Stalingrad. - M., 1982. - S. 41 .. . The overall size of the army increased, and Colonel-General Halder, the chief of the Hitlerite general staff of the ground forces, entered the following significant entry in his diary: “On May 1, 1942, 318 thousand people are missing in the East. It was proposed to send 240 thousand people to the army in the East in May. For the period from May to September there is a reserve of 960 thousand young conscripts. Then in September there will be nothing left” Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: a military diary. - Smolensk, 2001. - S. 231. .

Somewhat later, a more precise document on the general state of the Nazi army was drawn up at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW. The certificate intended for Hitler stated: "The combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, due to the impossibility of fully ensuring their replenishment with people and materiel."

“And yet, by the summer of forty-two,” writes General Chuikov, “Hitler managed to concentrate quite significant forces against us. On the Soviet-German front, he had a six-million-strong army, numbering up to 43,000 guns and mortars, over three thousand tanks, and up to three and a half thousand combat aircraft. The forces are significant. Hitler started the war with the smaller ones” Chuikov V.I. Battle of the century. - M., 1985. - S. 211. .

Hitler undertook a campaign in the Caucasus with the aim of capturing oil sources, access to the border of Iran, to the Volga. He apparently expected that at a distance from the center of the country the resistance of the Soviet troops would not be so thorough.

By entering the Caucasus, Hitler hoped to draw Turkey into the war, which would give him another twenty to thirty divisions. By accessing the Volga and the Iranian border, he hoped to draw Japan into the war against the Soviet Union. The performance of Turkey and Japan was his last chance for success in the war against us. Only this can explain such a broadcast character of his directive for the spring-summer campaign of the forty-second year.

Let us turn to the text of this directive, known as Directive No. 41. Already the introduction does not contain an analysis of the current situation on the Soviet-German front, but propaganda idle talk.

The directive begins with these words: “The winter campaign in Russia is drawing to a close. Thanks to the outstanding courage and readiness of the soldiers of the Eastern Front for self-sacrifice, our defensive actions were crowned with a great success of German weapons. The enemy suffered huge losses in men and equipment. In an effort to capitalize on an apparent initial success, he used up most of the reserves intended for further operations this winter.

“The goal is,” reads the directive, “to finally destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and to deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military and economic centers.”

"...First of all, all available forces should be concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector in order to destroy the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge."

And here comes the disclaimer. "The final encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Ingermanland are postponed until a change in the situation in the encirclement area or the release of other forces sufficient for this create appropriate opportunities."

This reservation shows that Hitler, having at his disposal forces greater than those with which he began his campaign in Russia, did not dare to operate along the entire front, but concentrated everything in the south.

As General Chuikov wrote: “The directive is a document of a secret nature, a document with which a limited circle of people had the right to familiarize themselves, this is a document in which there is no place for propaganda formulations. He must accurately and soberly assess the situation. We see that in its premise the German command completely misjudges our forces, and tries to portray its defeat near Moscow as a military success. Underestimating our strength, Hitler at the same time overestimates his own. Chuikov V.I. Battle of the century. - S. 234. .

Thus, the main goal of the enemy offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. “However, unlike the Barbarossa plan,” writes A.M. Samsonov, - the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the "blitzkrieg" strategy. That is why Directive 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, to defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, to seize rich strategic raw materials southern regions USSR" Samsonov A.M. Stalingrad battle. - M., 1989. - S. 327. . To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and only after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task in the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.

On March 15, Hitler declared that during the summer of 1942 "the Russian army would be completely annihilated" Veltz G. Soldiers who were betrayed. - Smolensk, 1999. - S. 69. . It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the real strategy. But there was something else here as well.

Adventurist in its essence, Hitler's policy could not be based on deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations in 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack and even whether to attack at all on the Eastern Front became more and more difficult for the Nazi generals.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy's plan, the successful conduct, first of all, of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. In this strategic plan of the enemy, the acute need of fascist Germany for fuel was very strongly reflected.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the commanders of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler stated that "if he does not receive oil from Maykop and Grozny, he will have to end this war" Nuremberg Trials / Ed. Batova P.I. - M., 1994. - S. 178. . At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the loss of oil by the USSR would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a delicate calculation that was closer to its goal than is commonly believed after its final catastrophic failure" Liddell Hart BG Indirect Action Strategy. - M., 1997. - S. 347-348. .

So, the German military command no longer had confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. “The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began fighting on the continent of Europe. The Nazis did not doubt that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened. Dashichev V. I. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. T. 2: Aggression against the USSR. Fall of the Third Empire. - M., 1983. - S. 125. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR were looming for some people completely differently than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity in this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the question arose before the German high command in what form to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of the chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. 1942 was last year, in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to be decided what should be done on a front of 3,000 kilometers long in order to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that on most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive. Stalingrad: the lessons of history / Ed. Chuikova V.I. - M., 1980. - S. 134.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among the Nazi generals. “The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed to carry out an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front in order to capture Leningrad. Halder ultimately also stood for the resumption of the offensive, but, as before, he continued to consider the central direction to be decisive and recommended that the main attack on Moscow be carried out by the forces of Army Group Center Butlar von. War in Russia / World War 1939-1945 - M., 1957.- S. 92. . Halder believed that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl, ordered the main efforts of the German troops in the summer of 1942 to be sent south to seize the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, it was planned to postpone the operation to capture Leningrad until the moment when the troops in the south were released.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, counting on successive operations to defeat the Soviet troops here piece by piece. Thus, although when planning the 1942 campaign, Hitler's strategists for the first time began to waver, nevertheless, as before, the top military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a single point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited.

According to the plan of the Hitlerite military-political leadership, the Nazi troops in the summer campaign of 1942 still had to achieve the military and political goals set by the Barbarossa plan, which in 1941 were not achieved due to the defeat near Moscow. The main blow was supposed to be delivered on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in order to capture the city of Stalingrad, enter the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and the fertile regions of the Don, Kuban and Lower Volga, disrupt communications connecting the Center of the country with the Caucasus, and create conditions for ending the war in their favor (see Appendix 1). Hitler's strategists believed that the loss of Donbass and Caucasian oil would seriously weaken the Soviet Union, and the exit of Nazi troops in Transcaucasia would disrupt its ties with its allies through the Caucasus and Iran, and help draw Turkey into the war against it.

Based on the tasks set, changes were made to the structure of command and control of troops on the southern wing of the German Eastern Front. Army Group "South" (Field Marshal F. von Bock) was divided into two: Army Group "B" (4th tank, 2nd and 6th field German and 2nd Hungarian armies; Colonel General M . von Weichs) and Army Group "A" (1st tank, 17th and 11th field German and 8th Italian armies; Field Marshal V. List).

For the offensive in the Stalingrad direction, the 6th Field Army (General of Tank Forces F. Paulus) was allocated from Army Group B. On July 17, 1942, it included 13 divisions, 3,000 guns and mortars, and about 500 tanks. It was supported by aviation of the 4th Air Fleet (up to 1200 aircraft).

The capture of Stalingrad was very important to Hitler for several reasons. It was the main industrial city on the banks of the Volga (a vital transportation route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia). The capture of Stalingrad would provide security on the left flank of the German armies advancing into the Caucasus. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin, Hitler's main enemy, made the capture of the city a winning ideological and propaganda move. Stalin also had ideological and propaganda interests in defending the city that bore his name.

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On October 1, 1942, as a result of a counterattack by units of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front, a number of enemy documents were captured, among which was one curious scheme. According to A.I. Eremenko, her “the content ... went far beyond not only the army scale, but even the scale of the army group and concerned, in essence, the entire Soviet-German front. It was a diagram drawn in pencil on a plain sheet of paper and graphically representing the plan of the Nazis for the summer of 1942 (see Diagram 14). In part, the data of this scheme coincided with the corresponding directives of Hitler, now made public. Dates were also indicated on the diagram, which, apparently, meant the timing of the capture of certain points by fascist troops..

This scheme, apparently, was transferred to Moscow and on November 6-7, 1942, the whole country learned about its content. Comrade Stalin, in his report on the 25th anniversary of the VOSR, said: “Recently, a German officer of the German General Staff fell into the hands of our people. This officer found a map with the designation of the plan for the advancement of German troops in terms of time. This document shows that the Germans intended to be in Borisoglebsk on July 10 of this year, in Stalingrad on July 25, in Saratov on August 10, in Kuibyshev on August 15, in Arzamas on September 10, in Baku on September 25.

This document fully confirms our data that the main goal of the German summer offensive was to bypass Moscow from the east and strike at Moscow, while the southward advance had as its goal, among other things, the diversion of our reserves away from Moscow and the weakening of the Moscow front so that it would be easier to strike at Moscow.

In short, the main goal of the German summer offensive was to encircle Moscow and end the war this year.

From that moment on, all Soviet military historiography, describing German plans for the summer of 1942, focused exclusively on this report. Even in secret works like "Collection of materials on the study of the experience of war No. 6 (April-May 1943)" they wrote (p. 9): “October 1, 1942, on the Stalingrad front in the Sadovoye region, a map with a schematic plan of the enemy’s offensive was plotted on it was seized from a murdered German officer of the general staff. This document confirms the predictions of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army regarding the German planning of the summer campaign of 1942 (Scheme 1).”

What can we say about more accessible works (Zamiatin N.M. and others. Battle of Stalingrad. M., 1944; Samsonov A. At the walls of Stalingrad. M., 1952; Telpukhovsky B.S. A great victory Soviet army near Stalingrad. M., 1953, etc.). In the article "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" of the new, second edition of the "Big Soviet encyclopedia» (T. 7. S. 172) this version with a colorful map was also presented.

In the meantime, works began to appear in the West that described real German plans for the summer of 1942. Some of them were reviewed in the semi-secret journal "Military Thought" (then published with the stamp "Only for generals, admirals and officers of the Soviet army and navy") and, of course, this moment was declared a falsification. Here, in particular, is an excerpt from a review of the book by B. Liddell Garth "The Other Side of the Hill" (VM. 1950. No. 6. S. 92-93): “Describing the plans for operations in 1942, the author of the book evaluates them as “masterful planning by General Halder” (p. 63). But these plans, according to the author, failed because Hitler split the forces of the German army, setting two tasks for it: to occupy Stalingrad and seize the oil of the Caucasus (p. 208) ... Speaking about the fact that Hitler sought to provide Germany with Caucasian oil, the author tries to deny the fact that the German high command in 1942 pursued the goal of bypassing Moscow, and claims that the Germans needed Stalingrad only in order "to secure their flank when attacking the Caucasus" (p. 208). However, it has long been known that the main goal of the German offensive in 1942 was to bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and the Urals and then occupy it.

Approximately the same was written in the review of the book by Walter Görlitz “The Second World War. 1939-1945", published in two volumes in 1951-1952. (VM. 1955. No. 5. P. 92).

But the inertia of the Stalinist report (especially after the death of the speaker himself) could not last forever, and the first bell about the upcoming revision of views on German plans in 1942 sounded in the same issue of Military Thought, in which the review of Görlitz was published. In the article by Colonel-General P. Kurochkin “The Victory of Soviet military art in the Great Patriotic War”, in an excerpt about the armed struggle in the summer of 1942, perhaps for the first time, the version about bypassing Moscow was not voiced (p. 22): “The summer campaign of 1942 began with the almost simultaneous offensive of the Soviet troops in the Kharkov region, and the German fascist ones in the Crimea, in the Rzhev region and south of Leningrad. The enemy managed in May-June to liquidate our bridgeheads on the Kerch Peninsula and near Sevastopol, to encircle part of the advancing troops near Kharkov. Having achieved these successes, and also taking advantage of the absence of a second front, the Nazi command concentrated large forces on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front and launched a new offensive in the southeast direction. Lacking sufficient forces for an offensive in several directions, as was the case in 1941, the enemy was still able to concentrate large forces on one sector of the front and achieve new serious successes. The Soviet Army again found itself forced to conduct heavy defensive battles with superior enemy strongmen, now in the Stalingrad and North Caucasian directions.

However, the final blow was dealt by the release in 1956 of the collection of articles "The most important operations of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." edited by d.h.s. Colonel P.A. Zhilina. In the article “The Battle of Stalingrad” (written by Colonels A.V. Karatyshkin and K.A. Cheryomukhin, p. 110), Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942 was quoted with the plans of the German command for the upcoming campaign. Moreover, you should not associate the contents of the collection with the well-known report of N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The imprint of the book shows that it was handed over to the set on 07/11/55, and signed for printing on 01/30/56.

The journal "Military Thought" also had a hand in changing the situation. First, in the 10th issue of the magazine for 1956, an article by Colonel N. Pavlenko “The Struggle for the Strategic Initiative in the Great Patriotic War” was published, where both the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 and the plans of the parties in it were briefly reviewed. Then, in the next, 11th issue, an article by Colonel-General A. Tarasov "On the question of the plan for the summer campaign of the Nazi command on the Soviet-German front in 1942" is published. Its beginning already sets in a revelatory mood (p. 64): “In our literature, the opinion has been established that the main goal of the offensive of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front in 1942 was Moscow, with the mastery of which the end of the war in the East was also associated. In works devoted to the Great Patriotic War, in particular, it is argued that the Nazi command sought to achieve this strategic task by delivering the main blow in the Stalingrad direction. With access to the Volga and the capture of Stalingrad, the enemy troops allegedly had to develop their attack to the north with the aim of deep bypassing Moscow from the east, isolating Moscow from the Volga and Ural rear and subsequently capturing it. The offensive of the enemy in the south towards the Caucasus was considered as an auxiliary one, aimed at diverting the reserves of the Soviet Army from Moscow and thereby weakening the defense of the Moscow direction. Further, the article outlined the history of the seizure of the document (it was specified that it was taken from a Romanian, and not a German officer), its content and comparison with both German documents and memoirs, and even Paulus’s testimonies (p. 69): “In a conversation with the author of this article, Paulus stated: “Believe me that until the very day of my surrender to the Soviet troops, I never heard from anyone that the goal of our offensive in 1942, even if distant, was Moscow. I learned about this only in captivity, according to Soviet materials, with which I completely disagree.

Of course, all the historical works that touch on this moment could not change instantly. In the same 1956, the brochure “Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)” was published. Resources for Political Studies,” where on page 25 was an outdated version. But in the 40th volume of the TSB, published in the same year, the latest data was used in the article “The Battle of Stalingrad 1942-1943”.

The last time the Stalinist version in domestic historical works was mentioned in an article by Colonel I. Parotkin “On the plan for the summer campaign of the Nazi command on the Soviet-German front in 1942” (Military History Journal. 1961. No. 1). In addition to a detailed story about the contents of the captured document, an image of the scheme was also given. I also note that Comrade. Parotkin, then still in the rank of lieutenant colonel, was part of the team of authors of one of the first works on the Battle of Stalingrad - “The Battle of Stalingrad. Brief essay "(M .: Military-historical department of the General Staff of the KA, 1944).

G.K. Zhukov said that after a search at his dacha and the seizure of documents and materials stored there in a safe in 1946, Stalin called him and said the following: "Are you going to write history? Don't. Let historians do this when we die.".