Methodological foundations of economic sociology. Economic sociology. List of used literature

This situation is largely characteristic of Western scientific thought. Up to the 90s in research and curricula economic sociology appeared more often under other names denoting narrower subject areas (“industrial sociology”, “sociology of labor relations”, etc.). Today it is being gradually institutionalized as a special discipline. So this is not a “purely Russian” problem.

The first one is given this course of lectures - to outline the conceptual framework of economic sociology as a special research direction; second - present systematic material for training course"Economic sociology", which is being introduced today as one of the main elements of the humanities cycle in an increasing number of universities.

Knowledge of numerous economic and sociological approaches, mastering a variety of methodological tools is necessary for us, in the final analysis, for a successful analysis of modern Russian society. It is these analytical possibilities that primarily determine for us the relevance of economic sociology. Nevertheless, we do not set ourselves the immediate goal of presenting detailed descriptions of the socio-economic system of Russia (or any other society), although a special section is devoted to contemporary Russian problems. The main goal is to substantiate a new research direction by systematizing the various approaches developed by economic and sociological thought. The book as a whole is written for Russia, but not about Russia. It offers a set of research tools that are useful in economic and sociological analysis.

Most of the proposed tools aim us at empirical research. However, consideration of the specific methods of empirical research developed in economic sociology is beyond the scope of this publication.

General Approach to economic sociology often comes down to the following: basic economic categories are taken (“production”, “distribution”, “market”, “profit”, etc.) and filled with some non-economic content, showing the limitations of “pure economism”. To completely abandon such a sociological reinterpretation of basic economic concepts is hardly possible and hardly expedient. However, one must understand that the absolutization of this approach can turn sociology into an “optional application” to economic theory, and an economic sociologist into a blurry shadow of an economist trying to “correct” and surpass the not entirely successful original. In most cases, however, we strive to take a different path: to follow the proper sociological logic, presenting economic sociology How process deployedtransferring the system of sociological concepts into the plane of economic relations.

Methodological basis Our constructions are a complex interweaving of a number of scientific areas and branches of knowledge, and first of all:

• American new economic sociology and "socio-economics" (M. Granovetter, A. Etzioni and others);
• British industrial sociology and stratification studies (J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood and others);
• German classical sociology (K. Marx, M. Weber, W. Sombart);
• Russian economic sociology and sociology of labor (T.I. Zaslavskaya, R.V. Ryvkina and others);
• history of economic sociology (R. Svedberg, N. Smelser, R. Holton).

Thus, we try to draw from very different sources in order to gain strength to forge our own path.

Methodological basis The proposed course of lectures served as a generalization of the experience of a number of British universities (Kent, Manchester, Oxford, Warwick, Essex, etc.).

The book uses relatively little material. Soviet and Russian theoretical and empirical research. This in no way indicates the author's disregard for domestic thought. On the contrary, we believe that it deserves special studies and special consideration, which, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this work 1 . The fact is that Russian intellectual traditions (pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet), for all their specifics, very often act as a bizarre refraction of Western conceptual schemes, an inverted hypostasis of Western tradition (Soviet Marxism in this case is no exception). Russian thought retains its spirit and draws its own plans, but prefers to build with “improvised” tools from “imported” material. As a result, logic forces one to start with Western currents of thought in order to later more successfully determine one's own coordinates.

The fact that the term "economic sociology" in Russia has only recently entered into active scientific circulation, of course, does not mean that such a term did not exist in Soviet sociology at all and that it should be built from scratch. Despite the fact that in the Soviet Union sociology was generally not officially recognized for a long time, economic sociology, disguised by other names, nevertheless had some operational scope in comparison with many other sociological disciplines. The official Marxist concept, recognizing the "relative independence" of social phenomena and their "active feedback” with fundamental industrial relations, left a certain niche for the application of sociological approaches.

• 1 A special review of the current state of domestic economic and sociological research is presented by us in the work: Radaev V.V. Economic sociology: main problems and development prospects//Ed. V.A. Yadov. 2nd ed. M., 1997 (in print). For an overview of pre-revolutionary and Soviet economic sociology, see: Kravchenko A.I. Sociology of labor and production / Sociology in Russia / Ed. b. A. Yadov. M: On the Vorobyovs, 1996. S. 291-322.

Of course, all areas of economic sociology in that period could not develop equally. Its individual branches have traditionally been strong, primarily the sociology of labor, as well as the socio-professional and economic aspects of the social structure of society. Such "industries", for example, as the sociology of the labor market, the theory of conflicts, and the sociology of entrepreneurship, at best, remained on the periphery of the research space or passed through the section of "criticism of bourgeois theories." Today, existing textbooks on the sociology of labor require serious revision. The main thing is that there is still no integral idea of ​​the subject matter of economic sociology. Thus, serious efforts are required to conceptually generalize and "finish" the foundation of the economic and sociological edifice.

The first serious attempt to categorize economic sociology as such was made in the works of the Novosibirsk school. It is summarized in the book by T.I. Zaslavskaya and R.V. Rybkina “Sociology of Economic Life”, published in 1991 (that is, almost 30 years after the publication of the book of the same name by N. Smelser). The emphasis is essentially on two topics: "Social Stratification" and "Economic Culture". Since 1986, within the framework of the Novosibirsk school, the teaching of the course "Economic Sociology" was started, which was still under the strong influence of traditional political economy, but at that time, certainly, innovative. Not directly related to the number of students of the Novosibirsk school, at the initial stage of developing problems, the author owed a lot to her works. Today, the approach proposed in this book, the choice of the main problems and the methods of their disclosure differ quite strongly.

book structure largely original in its construction and generally not simple. It includes ten sections, each of which highlights a specific topic or area of ​​economic and sociological research. Each topic is given two or three lectures, in which the initial concepts are revealed, classical and modern approaches are compared in the relevant field.

• 2 Among those who contributed to Soviet economic sociology are E.G. Antosenkova, Yu.V. Arugyunyan, T.I. Zaslavskaya, A.G. Hello, LL. Gordon, E.V. Klopova, A.K. Nazimov, I.M. Popov, N.M. Rimashevskaya, R.V. Ryvkin, M.Kh. Titmu, O.I. Shkaratan, V.N. Shubkin, V.Yadov and a number of others. A brief list of the main works is given in the book: Zaslavskaya T.N., Ryvkina R.V. Sociology of economic life. Novosibirsk. M.: Nauka, 1991. S. 30-31.

First section devoted to the definition of the subject of economic sociology. We approach this definition by specifying the methodological boundaries that separate economic theory and economic sociology. The first and second lectures reveal the features of two approaches based, respectively, on the models of "economic" and "sociological" man, they examine the historical evolution of these models, analyze the attempts of economic and sociological "imperialism". The third lecture completes the study of the complex relationship between economic and sociological approaches, and also analyzes methodological attempts at their possible synthesis. Finally, the subject of economic sociology is revealed.

Second section also has an introductory character. In the fourth lecture, we dive into one of the most important and complex methodological issues related to the structure of economic motivation and types of rationality. Here we show the irreducibility of this motivation to economic interest and the ambiguity of the concept of "rational economic behavior". In the fifth lecture, in a series of fragments devoted to the sociological interpretation of key economic concepts (property and power, distribution and justice, exchange and self-affirmation, consumption and complicity, etc.), the thesis about the social rootedness of economic action is developed.

The first role in which the economic entity plays is the role of the entrepreneur, therefore, in third section reveals a fan of approaches to the definition of entrepreneurship as an economic function, draws psychological picture classical entrepreneur, the historical roots of the entrepreneurial spirit are being “excavated”. This inevitably leads us to the analysis social relations within which an entrepreneurial action is formed; to the study of the environment from which entrepreneurial groups emerge; and finally, to fixing the ideological burden that the idea of ​​entrepreneurship invariably bears.

Organizational structures are the direct result of entrepreneurial activity. Respectively, eventop section devoted to the sociology of economic organizations. In the eighth lecture, the specifics of economic and sociological approaches to the theory of the firm are revealed, the general concept of "organization" is given, and its main features are characterized in detail.

Understanding the modern organization is linked to Weber's concept of the bureaucratic system. The ninth lecture examines the historical types of economic organization and the main ways of asserting intra-company authority (the entrepreneur thus turns into a manager).

The theme of organizational models and human behavior continues in essence and into fifth section. Here we are talking about establishing control over the labor process within an economic organization: how goals are set and the distribution of labor functions, regulation of the rhythm of work and evaluation of work performed. The tenth lecture characterizes the evolution of the strategies of managers (managers) as the dominant side of labor relations. In the eleventh lecture, we turn to the strategies of performers - individual and collective, spontaneous and organized.

In order for the labor process to begin, a person must find his place in the system of employment relations. Analysis of the problems of creating, distributing and changing jobs is at the intersection of the interests of many disciplines: labor economics in its neoclassical and institutionalist versions, sociology of labor and industrial sociology, labor relations and the sociology of professions. How the search for work and labor occurs, how the procedure for hiring and releasing workers is established, which determines the conditions and content of work, the level of its payment and forms of related benefits - this is discussed in sixth sectionle. In the twelfth lecture, the problems of the labor market are considered from the position of the employer, and in the thirteenth - from the position of those who offer their labor force. Finally, the fourteenth lecture is devoted to a special area of ​​employment - the household.

The appearance of the universality of human economic behavior disappears when we begin to consider it against the background of the relations of differentiated social groups. In the fifteenth lecture seventh section the basic concepts of social and economic stratification are revealed, an original typology of stratification systems is proposed, and the multidimensionality of stratification analysis is demonstrated by the example of distinguishing the economic elite and the "middle classes". The sixteenth lecture is devoted to three classical strands of stratification theories - Marxism, functionalism and Weberianism.

No matter how a researcher considers economic behavior - whether an economist or a sociologist - he always proceeds from some conceptual assumptions about what the world of economics under study is, what place it occupies in the historical process. AND in the eighth section course examines the sociological aspects of the history of the economy. The seventeenth lecture describes a number of models of unilinear evolution of the economy and society, and the eighteenth lecture presents models of parallel and cyclic development.

IN ninth section raises a complex and little-studied problem of the formation of economic ideologies. The nineteenth lecture reveals the general concept of ideological systems and describes their main types. Lecture 20 contains a sociological analysis of the transformation of economic ideologies based on the material of Russia in the last decade.

Finally, there is the question of applying economic-sociological approaches to the analysis of our own society. And last tenth section is devoted to the description of the Russian economic system, viewed through the prism of previously introduced sociological categories. The twenty-first lecture tells about the Soviet period, the twenty-second - about the post-Soviet decade.

Throughout the book, the focus is on human action. We start with models of his behavior in the economy and incentive economic motives, moving on to the consideration of specific economic roles (entrepreneur, manager, worker), as well as to the analysis of structural constraints within which human activity unfolds. He acts as a bearer of cultural norms, a member of economic organizations, a representative of social groups. Gradually we move to the societal level, where the action of the individual becomes part of a larger panoramic picture of the economy and society. At the same time, the figure of the economic entity is constantly followed by another figure - the researcher, who makes a choice between various conceptual schemes. All our reasoning about the "real behavior" of economic entities is carried out within the framework of specific beforebeliefs about man and social communities. It is these ideas that form the core of our work.

The field of economic sociology is too broad to be covered in a single work. And it is not difficult to foresee legitimate questions: why some problems are reflected in more detail, others less in detail, and the author does not touch on others at all. Truly, "one cannot grasp the immensity." The author has selected topics that seem to be the most important for the disclosure of the subject of economic sociology. Of course, this choice is somewhat subjective, but it is by no means arbitrary. In essence, each of the selected topics represents a whole trend in sociological or economic theory and deserves (more precisely, has long since deserved) separate monographic studies. Virtually every topic can be read and, with some exceptions, special lecture courses are actually given, so our presentation in many cases has an introductory, overview character. The book does not aim to give a detailed presentation of individual concepts. Rather, we are striving to highlight the main ideas, systematize heterogeneous areas and set benchmarks, according to which the reader, if desired, can independently understand the material of interest to him, which, of course, implies a certain level of motivation and professional training.

The materials contained in the book, of course, can be used in the educational process. They contain numerous references to the basic literature (where possible, given the relative availability of publications). Actually, the book itself grew out of a lecture course read by the author for economists and sociologists in Moscow universities (Higher School of Economics, Moscow Higher School of Social and Economic Sciences, etc.).

The book is intended for senior students of sociological and economic faculties and universities, for graduate students, teachers and researchers in the field of sociology and economic theory.

The book presented to the attention of the reader is the fruit of a long work. And the author would like to express his gratitude to the staff of the Sector of Economic Sociology of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ph.D. Ya.M. Roshchina, G.K. Bulychkina, A.V. Lutsenko and M.O. Shkaratan, together with whom in 1992-1996. specific economic and sociological projects were carried out. Although this book does not actually use the data obtained during the implementation of these projects, nevertheless, the joint empirical work has provided food for thought on many issues.

The author is extremely grateful to the leadership of the Russian Economic Journal (A.Yu. Melentiev, YuA. Bzhilyansky) and all the editorial staff who contributed to the preparation and publication in 1994-1996. cycle of sixteen articles that became the initial materials of the book 3 .

The author received many valuable comments from colleagues when discussing the manuscript and individual initial materials of the book. I am especially grateful to the reviewers T.I. Zaslavskaya and R.V. Rybkina, as well as V. Gimpelson (lectures 12-13), S.Yu. Roshchin (lectures 12-13), T. Shanin (lecture 14) and R. Shveri (lecture 4).

Of great importance was the technical assistance provided by O.N. Kulikova, O.I. Melnitskaya, D.R. Nazargalina, E.G. Petrakova and T.M. Sedov.

The book was written with financial support Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation(project N 95-06-17157a).

The book was published with financial support YingInstitute "Open Society"(program "Higher education").

• "See: Russian Economic Journal, 1994. No. 8-11; 1995. No. 1-4, 7-8, 10-11: 1996. No. * 1-2, 4-6.

Two approaches to man in social theory

"The economic approach is all-embracing, it applies to all human behavior" Gary Becker, "Economic Analysis and Human Behavior"

"The economic order is usually a function of the social, with the second providing the first" Carl Polanyi, "The Great Transformation"

The fate of sociology in our country is in many ways similar to the fate of "economics". Both disciplines were considered “bourgeois” for a long time, remained on the periphery of the research space, or partially disguised as “components of Marxism”. They are also related by the current rise in popularity. It is difficult to predict how the process of self-assertion of economic theory and sociology will go on (all popularity is not eternal), but today both disciplines have moved into the spotlight, and it has become necessary to define their methodological boundaries.

In the first two lectures we are going to trace how ideas about economic and social action have been formed and modified; to name the names of economists and sociologists who have made a significant contribution to the evolution of these ideas. Due to the limited volume of this book, we will not be able to present the content of the theories and restrict ourselves to the analysis of methodological approaches to human behavior in the economy. We already have examples of a successful description of the evolution of ideas about man in economic theory 1 . I would like, however, to show a person more fully, in many ways, as he is seen from two sides - by the authors of economic and sociological doctrines.

• 1 See, for example: Avtonomov B . C. Man in the mirror of economic theory. M.: Science. 1993.

As a hypothesis, we can assume that each research discipline has an internal cycle of its development, which can be conditionally divided into six stages.

1. The preclassical stage, when the discipline is founded, its initial concepts are defined and key terms are introduced.
2. The classical stage, when a general disciplinary approach is formed, the first systems of concepts are developed.
3. The neoclassical stage, or the stage of professionalization, during which the systems of prerequisites that form the “methodological core” are clearly formulated, the categorical apparatus is being developed in detail, working models and tools are being created. At the same time, there is an integration of the discipline and its isolation from other areas of knowledge.
4. The stage of professional maturity, when there is a relatively isolated development of the discipline, its completion and the filling of "white spots". During the same period, its main research areas were formed, clarifying methodological relationships among themselves.
5. The stage of crisis and expansion, when the prerequisites are adjusted and the own boundaries are redefined, attempts are made to invade adjacent areas and actively use interdisciplinary approaches.
6. The stage of fragmentation and reshaping, when several relatively independent branches of knowledge arise, which are often mixed with related disciplines 2 .

Having briefly familiarized ourselves with these stages in the first two lectures, following first the economists and then the sociologists, in the third lecture we will move on to the initial definition of the subject matter of economic sociology.

Lecture 1. The evolution of "economic man"

There are many approaches to defining a set beforeparcels, from which economic theory proceeds in modeling economic behavior. It seems to us that there are four such initial premises.

• 2 The transition from one stage in the development of a scientific discipline to another can often be accompanied by temporary crises associated with a partial transformation of its theoretical "core". They affect primarily the dominant school, but look like a crisis of the discipline as a whole. Examples include the crisis of Rikarianism in the middle of the 19th century. and marginalism in the first third of the 20th century, T. Parsons' structural functionalism in sociology in the 60s, and Keynesianism a decade later.

1. The person is independent. This is an atomized individual who makes independent decisions based on his personal preferences.
2. The person is selfish. He primarily cares about his own interest and seeks to maximize his own benefit.
3. The man is rational. He consistently strives for the goal and calculates the comparative costs of one or another choice of means to achieve it.
4. The person is informed. He not only knows his own needs well, but also has sufficient information about the means of satisfying them.

Before us appears the image of a "competent egoist" who rationally and independently of others pursues his own benefit and serves as a model of the "normal average" person. For such subjects of all kinds, political, social and cultural factors are nothing more than external frames or fixed boundaries that keep them in some kind of bridle, preventing some egoists from realizing their benefits at the expense of others in too frank and rude ways. This “normal average” person is the basis of the general model called homo economicus (“economic person”). Almost all major economic theories are based on it, with certain deviations. Although, of course, the model of economic man did not remain unchanged and underwent a very complex evolution.

Classic stage 3 . The figure of the "economic man", this "competent egoist", led by an "invisible hand" to the personal and public good, first rises to its full height in the works of the classics of English and French political economy at the end of the 18th century. The ancestor of the ideas underlying it is deservedly considered the "great Scot" A. Smith(1723-1790). Man in his work "The Wealth of Nations" is an autonomous individual, driven by two natural motives - self-interest and a tendency to exchange 4 .

• 1 Due to the brevity of the presentation, we do not consider the preclassical stage in political economy (the beginning of the 17th - the end of the 18th centuries), when its name was introduced (A. Montkretien, 1575-1621) and the first stones of the future economic building were laid (W. Petty, 1623 -1687, P. Boisguillebert, 1646-1714, and the Physiocrats, led by F. Quesnay, 1694-1774).

Radical utilitarianism played an important role in the cultivation of homo economicus J. Bentama( 1748-1832) - a consistent and convincing preacher of hedonistic principles. In his “moral arithmetic”, the basis of all human actions is the principle of benefit, meaning the achievement of the greatest pleasure and the desire to avoid suffering in every way 5 .

Inspired by the ideas of A. Smith, classical political economy proceeds to a consistent rationalization of the understanding of economic life. This rationalization is associated with the simplification of the relations under consideration, a decrease in the number of variables involved. Recognizing in principle (as a matter of course) the differences between classes and countries, political economists try to eliminate these differences in a set of general economic principles, which are given the character of objective laws. It is the derivation of general principles, and not a description of the entire richness of economic life, that sets as its task J. B. Say(1767-1832), who ensured the victory of Smith's doctrine in France 6 . The English pastor G. Malthus(1766-1834) these general principles acquire the status of natural law, the infamous law of population, whose promulgation influenced so many eminent minds. And with the advent of the creator of the technique of economic analysis D. Ricardo(1772-1823), the establishment of objective economic laws turns into the basic principle of research 7 (note that A. Smith did not have such laws yet). True, important digressions are allowed already at this stage. So, a more eclectic "last classic" J. S. Mill(1806-1873) separates the laws of production from the laws of distribution, likening the former to the laws of nature and presenting the latter as a product of the social order 8 . But man is increasingly turning into a set of abstract principles, from which all socio-economic relations are then directly derived.

• 4 Here is one of the most famous statements of A. Smith: “A person constantly needs the help of his neighbors, and in vain will he expect it only from their location. He reaches his goal more quickly if he appeals to their selfishness and can show them that it is in their own interest to do for him what he requires of them ... Not from the benevolence of the butcher, brewer or baker, we expect to get our dinner, but their own interests. We turn not to their humanity, but to their selfishness, and we never tell them about our needs, but about their benefits ”(Smith A. Research on the nature and causes of the wealth of peoples. T. I. M .: Sotsekgiz, 1935. C .17).
• 5 “Nature has subjected man to the power of pleasure and pain. We owe them all our ideas, they determine all our judgments, all our decisions in life ... The principle of utility subordinates everything to these two engines. And further: “For the supporter of the principle of utility, virtue is good only in view of the pleasures that flow from it; vice is evil only because of the suffering that accompanies it. A moral good is a good only in consequence of its ability to produce physical goods; moral evil only in its ability to produce physical evil” (I. Bentham, Principles of Legislation. M.: Soldatenkov, 1896, pp. 4-5).
• 6 See: Say J.B. Treatise of political economy. M.: Soldatenkov, 1896. S. 17, 58-63.

man in learning K. Marx(1818-1883) is also quite consistent with the canons of the "economic man". K. Marx largely borrows both the economic determinism of D. Ricardo and the utilitarian principles of J. Bentham criticized by him. Does K. Marx act directly as a subject of economic actions? No, the individual has to recede into the background, and production relations become more and more subjectless, impersonal. By K. Marx's own admission, the figures of economic subjects for him "are the personification of economic categories, bearers of certain class relations and interests" 10 (we will refer to the teachings of K. Marx more than once).

It should be emphasized, however, that almost all the main works of the classics of political economy are saturated with elements moral philosophy. The implementation of the utilitarian principle is not associated by them with the liberation of the animal principles of man, on the contrary, it relies on an individual who is quite developed mentally and morally, and involves maintaining the nobility of characters. In other words, the "ordinary average" layman still had to grow up to a real "economic man" 11 .

• 7 “For the sake of simplifying the argument, Ricardo and his followers often considered a person as a constant and never took the trouble to study possible variations” (Marshall A. Principles of economic science. T. 3. M: Progress-Univers, 1993. P. 197) .
• "See: Mill J.S. Fundamentals of political economy. T. 1. M .: Progress, 1980. S. 337-338.
• 9 Here is how F. Bastiat (1801-1850), an enthusiastic admirer of economic liberalism, wrote about this: “Economic laws operate according to the same principle, whether it is a matter of a large community of people, of two individuals, or even of one person doomed by fate live alone” (Bastia F. Economic harmonies (appeal to the French youth). M.: Soldatenkov, 1896, pp. 173, 205).
• "Marx K. Capital. T. 1 / Marx K., Engels F. Works. 2nd ed. T. 23. P. 10.
• "See, for example: Mill J.S. On freedom. St. Petersburg: Kotomin, 1882. S. 165.

neoclassical stage. If in the works of the classics of political economy there is a complex interweaving of economic and non-economic, scientific and ethical approaches, then "margin-sheet revolution" 1870-1880 filled with the pathos of the methodological purification of economic theory from "foreign" impurities in the introduction of political and moral principles. The model of "economic man" in the proper sense of the word appeared here 12 . At the same time, marginalists shift their focus to the plane of consumer choice, and they see a person as a utility maximizer. The basis of his behavior is no longer so much selfishness as, to an increasing degree, economic rationality. The individual not only calculates his own benefit, but also optimizes his actions - by the way, the matter is not at all simple. A "normal" person is likened to an economics professor 13 . But his moral qualities seem to cease to interest researchers in this area. Significantly And that utility is presented by marginalists as a function. This implies the introduction of additional economic prerequisites regarding the nature of individual preferences: their stability, transitivity, and saturation monotony are provided for. As a result, the way to the use of the mathematical apparatus is opened.

Within the framework of marginalism, somewhat apart from mathcal direction[W. Jevons (1835-1882); L. Walras (1834-1910); V. Pareto (1848-1923)], who develops the concept of general economic equilibrium, is a subjectivist direction headed by the leader Austrian school K. Menger (1840-1921) and his followers E. Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914) and F. Wieser (1851-1926). Menger's man is driven by one "guiding idea" - the desire to satisfy his needs as fully as possible. It is inherent in man by nature itself and does not need the support of the law or the power of coercion, free from any public interest 14 . New economic institutions, according to Menger, arise as a result of the understanding by some entrepreneurs of the profitability of some economic forms. The rest imitate their successful actions, which are then reinforced by the powerful forces of habit and law 15 . Representatives of the Austrian school consistently assert the principle of methodological individualism 16 . In addition, a person in their understanding is not an “instant optimizer” and is not free from errors.

• 12 It is pointless to look for a special concept of the "competent egoist" in the text of A. Smith's The Wealth of Nations, and the famous "invisible hand" is mentioned by the author a couple of times without any emphasis.
• 13 See: Avtonomov B . C. The Model of Man in Bourgeois Political Economy from Smith to Marshall / Origins: Questions of the History of the National Economy and Economic Thought. Issue. I. M.: Economics, 1989. S. 213-219.
• 14 See: Menger K. Foundations of Political Economy / Austrian School in Political Economy: K. Menger, E. Böhm-Bawerk, F. Wieser. M.: Economics, 1992. S. 150-151, 195.

Attempts to synthesize marginalist and sociological approaches are being made A. Marshall(1842-1924), who is trying to introduce a “flesh and blood man” 17 into economic theory, forcing him to act within the framework of optimization models. But the desire for accuracy makes it necessary to select forms of behavior that are more stable and accessible to measurement in monetary terms. As a result, empirical observations of human behavior and working optimization models diverge further and further.

The last point in this discrepancy is put in the “dispute about methods” (Methodenstreit) of K. Menger with the leader of the young German historical school G. Schmoller(1838-1917) in 1883-1884 18 The victory of K. Menger meant a break in the main branch of economic theory with historical and sociological currents. The time has come for its professionalization and honing of working tools. Figures like J. Schumpeter, who do not abandon attempts at synthesis and speak of the need to include economic sociology in economic analysis, remain proudly single.

Stage of professional maturity. It comes in the 20-30s of the XX century. and is associated primarily with the development of the main neoclassical direction(mainstream) towards its further formalization. In the spirit of V. Pareto, economic theory is freed from all kinds of “psychologisms” (P. Samuelson and others): it doesn’t matter what is maximized and for what reasons, what matters is the logic of choice attributed to a person and the sequence of actions.

• 15 Menger calls this the "sociological method" of explanation (see: Menger K. Research on the methods of the social sciences and political economy in particular. St. Petersburg: Tsezerling, 1894, pp. 158, 164-166, 269). .
• 16 “The observation that we first made over an isolated individual, and then over a small society temporarily separated from other people, equally applies to the more complex relations of the people and human society in general” (Menger K. Foundations of Political Economy. S. 115).
• 17 See: Marshall A. Principles of economic science. T. 1. S. 83.
• 11 K. Menger rejects the methodological collectivism of historians, criticizes the nominalistic positions of G. Schmoller and defends the legitimacy of the deductive derivation of laws as opposed to the empirical descriptive approach (for a presentation of the key positions of the Methodenstreit, see: Bostaph S. The Methodological Debate Between Carl Menger and the German Historicists // Atlantic Economic Journal, September 1978, Vol VI, No 3, P 3-16).

As a result "Keynesian revolution* the floors of macroeconomic theory are being completed. At the same time, DMS. Keynes(1883-1946), although he does not abandon methodological individualism, he weakens this premise. He points out that individual rational actions do not always lead to the corresponding result at the social level and that there is another, supra-individual rationality.

Keynes actively operates with psychological factors (propensity to save, preference for liquidity, etc.) in determining macroeconomic dependencies and even formulates psychological laws. However, this psychologism is formal and serves to justify the uniformity of human actions. It seems that the introduced preferences belong to a society outside of time and to a person without nationality 19 .

Alternative direction presented new Austrianschool(L. Mises, 1889-1972; F. Hayek, 1899-1992). If in Keynes's assumptions a person is still to some extent free from utilitarianism - he is able to limit his egoism, pose moral problems, then F. Hayek's person simply follows tradition and "adapts to the unknown." Competition produces a selection of rational and irrational rules of behavior, some of which are fixed in traditions. F. Hayek adheres to the positions evolutionary liberalism. Its general order is not a product of the human mind, it arises spontaneously - as a result of many private decisions of individuals using the "dispersed knowledge" available to them 20 .

Even K. Menger questioned the infallibility of the "economic man", who often takes imaginary benefits for real ones, and tried to introduce a time factor into his actions. Continuing this line, F. Hayek criticizes the established concept of equilibrium, which proceeds from the action of one person who has a plan and does not deviate from this plan 21 . Difficulties, in his opinion, begin with the appearance of several independent individuals. Their expectations may come into mutual conflict. Moreover, if one changes his plans - and this may happen due to a change in tastes or under the influence of new facts learned by chance or as a result of special efforts - the balance will immediately be disturbed. The question naturally arises as to the role social institutions as stable sets of regulatory rules, norms and attitudes in the acquisition and distribution of knowledge among individuals.

• 19 As for the psychological laws of J. Keynes, “their psychologism is expressed primarily in the fact that empirically obtained patterns of changes in consumption due to changes in income are explained by certain internal inclinations of a person” (Makasheva N.A. Ethical Foundations of Economic Theory. M.: INION, 1993. S. 46).
• 20 See: Hayek F. Pernicious arrogance: the mistakes of socialism. M: Novosti, 1992.

During the first half of the 20th century, a more radical alternative to the neoclassical direction developed in the form of "old" institutionalism. The first American institutionalists (T. Veblen, W. Mitchell, J. Commons) abandon the atomistic approach to man in favor of organicism. Institutes are declared an independent subject of study. The man of the "old" institutional school follows not only interest, but also habit; his preferences change over time; he unites in groups and is able to enter into conflicts over power. However, the school as such did not arise during this period, since the first institutionalists failed to develop a unified methodology and a clear system of concepts. So, the founder of the direction of the American economist and sociologist T. Veblen(1857-1929) the study of institutions is interspersed with judgments about instincts that directly go to the biological metaphors of man (we should mention the instincts for mastery and rivalry, self-preservation and envious comparison); the explanation of institutional changes by economic forces (“monetary difficulties”) is adjacent to the subordination of monetary motives in the process of conspicuous consumption 22 .

Attracts the attention of a figure almost unknown to us J. Commons(1862-1945). He proceeds from the primacy of collective action, defines institutions as "collective action that controls individual action", and develops the concept of a contract economy built on the contractual relations of organized pressure groups in the form of corporations, trade unions and political parties. Commons' terminology is not conventional for economic theory and is saturated with legal categories 23 .

• 21 The concept of equilibrium “assumes the assumption of a perfect market, where each event is instantly known to each participant ... It seems that the “economic man”, this skeleton in the closet that we prayed and worshiped, returned through the back door in the form of a quasi -omniscient (quasi - omniscient) individual "(Hayek F. A. Economics and Knowledge // Economica, February 1937. Vol. IV. No. 13. P. 44-45).
• 22 See: Veblen T. Theory of the Leisure Class. M: Progress, 1984. S. 139-140, 200-206 and others.

In general, the work of the early institutionalists fell on the margins of economic theory, most economists considered their conclusions a road to nowhere. But their role in posing many important problems is recognized to this day 24 .

During this period, the young German historical school loses its remnants of influence (its line is continued more by economic sociologists than by economists). And even in Germany, neoclassicism is celebrating its victory. In parallel, from the criticism of "historians" a special trend arises ordoliberalism Freiburg School. Her leader W. Eucken(1891-1950) advocates a combination of theoretical homogeneity with the principle of historicism. Man appears to him in the form of a whole gallery of types corresponding to different "economic orders" 25 . In this case, the formula of each type is composed of a limited number of fixed principles, namely:

• objective or subjective adherence to economic
• principle;
• constancy or variability of the level of needs;
• adherence to the principle of maximizing income;
• long term plans;
• the strength of traditional ties.

Gaining strength after World War II administrativebehaviorism(G. Simon and others), considering not only the results of rational choice (substantive rationality), but also the decision-making process itself, taking into account the limit of human cognitive capabilities (procedural rationality) 26 . The neoclassical economics of information (J. Stigler and others) proceeds from the fact that a person is looking for the best options until the search costs exceed the expected savings. According to G. Simon(b. 1916), a person behaves quite rationally, but his intelligence and computational abilities are limited (" intendedly rational but only limitedly so "). Often he does not reach the optimal solution, stopping at some option acceptable to him. Thus, his actions are characterized not by perfect, but by "bounded rationality" 27 (for more on the rationality of economic action, see Lecture 4).

• 23 See: Commons J. Economics of Collective Action. Madison. University of Wisconsin Press, 1970 (1950). P. 23-35.
• 24 See: Hodgson G. The Return of Institutional Economics /Smelser N. t Swedberg R. (eds.). The Handbook of Economic Sociology. princeton. Princeton University Press, 1994. P. 58-76.
• 25 “As in the study of diverse economic forms, we must abandon the usual well-worn schemes in relation to the economic person in order to see a person in the economy as he was and what he is” (Oyken V. Fundamentals of National Economy. M: Economics , 1996, p. 279).
• 26 See: Simon G. Rationality as a process and product of thinking // Thesis, 1993. Vol. 1. Issue. 3. S. 27.

G. Simon's assertion that "human behavior, even if rational, cannot be described by a handful of invariant features" 28 can be considered a call for active revisionism in the field of economic theory, the era of which came approximately in the mid-60s.

Stage of crisis and expansion. The gradual isolation of the economic and mathematical elite in the postwar period inevitably leads to a serious crisis in the econometrics of its models. There is a growing understanding of the impossibility of doing without the analysis of non-economic factors. In this situation, some economists, like L/. Friedman(b. 1912), openly declare their indifference to the premises of the theory, provided that it has good predictive power 29 . Others, realizing the theoretical weakness and incompleteness of the conceptual premises, are trying to complete them. And the development of economic theory in many ways follows the path of clarifying and limiting its assumptions (which also means expanding the field of action of the economic subject). The selfishness of behavior, the independence of the individual, or the degree of his awareness are called into question. On this wave, very different directions of economic theory are being established, which can be considered “soft alternatives” to traditional neoclassicism. We will dwell on them in some detail.

• 27 “Behavioral theories of rational choice—theories of bounded rationality—do not have the simplicity of classical theory. But by way of compensation, their assumptions about human abilities are much weaker. Thus, more modest and more realistic requirements are put forward for the knowledge and computational abilities of people. Nor do these theories predict that people will achieve equality of marginal cost and reward” (Simon H. Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations // Ameri can Economic Review. September 1979. Vol. 69. No. 4. P. 496).
• 21 Simon H. Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations // American Economic Review. September 1979. Vol. 69.No. 4.P. 510.
• 29 "A theory cannot be tested by direct comparison of its premises with 'reality'... Full 'realism' is obviously unattainable, and the question of whether a theory is 'sufficiently' realistic can only be resolved by whether it gives it is good enough predictions for this purpose or better predictions compared to alternative theories ”(M. Friedman. Methodology of positive economic science // Thesis, 1994. V. 2. Issue 4. P. 49). “The more important a theory is, the more unrealistic (in the indicated sense) its premises” (ibid., p. 29).

Theories of rational choice (rational choice). The essence of any rational choice theory is the following premise: Among the possible alternatives of action, a person chooses thatwhich, according to his expectations, best fitshis interests, subject to his personal preferences and the limitations of the external environment™. Within the framework of this theory, several directions have been formed, one of which is represented by chikaga school. Her most prominent representatives G. Becker(b. 1930) and J. Spshgler(p. 1911), In an effort to expand the scope of economic logic, they extend the concept of capital accumulation to human labor and consumption behavior. At the same time, they do not consider the analysis of tastes and preferences to be a “forbidden zone” left to the mercy of other social sciences. A statement is postulated about the constancy of tastes over time and their similarity for different individuals and groups (and not as a logical premise, but as a characteristic of real economic behavior) 31 . Chicago school theorists do not believe that a person has all the information. However, this does not interfere with the rationality of his behavior. On the contrary, it is the economical expenditure of resources on a certain optimal amount of information and the neglect of information excesses (rational ignorance) that become an important element of rationality.

The general formula of human behavior, according to G. Becker, is as follows: "Participants maximize utility with a stable set of preferences and accumulate optimal amounts of information and other resources in a variety of different markets" 32 . And all changes in behavior are explained by changes in prices and incomes.

In general, once "peripheral" areas of economic theory, invading the field of sociology and other social sciences, have experienced difficult times. They are now much more favorably received by the economic community and are beginning to claim a place in the "theoretical core." Just look at the list of Nobel Prize winners in economics, which were received by: rational choice theorists J. Buchanan And R. Vogel; institutionalists G. Myrdal And D. North; founder of the theory of transaction costs R. Coase and behaviorist G. Simon (the only "semi-sociologist"). And the main "interventionist" G. Becker (also a Nobel laureate) headed the American Economic Association as President.

Conclusion. IN Most of the theories mentioned above, with many deviations from the original model and versatile criticism of the "economic man", still adhere to the average approach to a person whose actions are set by a network of impersonal exchange or contract relations. Ultimately, social institutions are derived from a certain “human nature”, or from what F. Knight (1885-1972) called “human nature as we know it”,

In considering this human nature, the emphasis is, as a rule, on individual psychological factors (A. Marshall even declared economic theory a "psychological science"). Actions subject to emerging social norms are marginalized without much attention 52 . The general logic is ultimately this: if something does not lend itself to rational logical explanation, it belongs to the realm of social, political and psychological factors. Are people not behaving rationally? This is due to their "psychology", "emotions". As for the periodic raids into the zones of sociological problems, they are carried out, as a rule, without much knowledge of sociological traditions.

Finally, despite the occasional interest in historical and sociological problems, most economists remain on fundamentally ahistorical positions. No one particularly objects to taking into account the fact of development. But many, following K. Menger, consider this requirement to be banal, believing that historical forms are already given to us today in their removed form. In fact, the private capitalist order is taken as a universal premise.

• 52 “Economists prefer cognitive psychology to cultural anthropology” (DiMaggio P . Culture and Economy / Smelser N . t Swedberg R . (eds .). The Handbook of Economic Sociology . P . 29).

We will consider how alternative approaches to human behavior developed in the next lecture.

18. Economic sociology: concept, essence

Economic sociology is a direction of social research that involves the analysis of economic activity from the standpoint of social theory.

There are several trends in economic sociology: old economic sociology (Karl Marx, Max Weber, Sombart, Joseph Schumpeter, Emil Durkheim and others), new economic sociology, also known as neo-institutional economics (Ronald Coase, Mark Grannoweter, Neil Fligstein, J. Coleman, V. Radaev, Douglas North, Kenneth Arrow (Kenneth Arrow), George Stigler (George Stigler), Armen Alchian (Armen Alchian), Harold Demsetz (Harold Demsetz), Oliver Williamson (Oliver Williamson), V. Zelitser and a number of others) , as well as the domestic Novosibirsk school of economic sociology (T. I. Zaslavskaya, R. I. Ryvkina, Z. I. Kalugina, T. Yu. Bogomolova, P. S. Rostovtsev, E. E. Goryachenko, G. Kirdina, O E. Bessonova and a number of others) and the Belarusian economic and sociological school (G.N. Sokolova, O.V. Kobyak and others).

This discipline studies the totality of socio-economic processes, whether they relate to markets or the state, households or individuals.

This direction uses a variety of data collection and analysis methods, including sociological methods. And most importantly, this is a special approach based on specific ideas about human action, the development of the economy and society.

Economic sociology eschews the model of man offered by traditional economic theory. The "economic man" is too selfish and isolated from other people, excessively rational and informed. It acts like an automaton, subject to the logic of economic interest. While economic sociology does not turn a person into a sociological automaton, just as thoughtlessly obeying prescribed norms. A person in economic sociology is able to switch from one logic of action to another, showing both will and flexibility. This is a person capable of strategy - consistent and reflexive actions, building his own future. At the same time, “our” person does not hang in an airless space. He is included in the interweaving of formal and informal networks, is included as a boss or subordinate in various organizations, acts as part of social groups, belongs to local and national communities.

At the moment, the following currents of the new economic sociology can be distinguished:

Sociology of rational choice

network approach

New institutionalism

· Cultural-historical approach

ethnographic approach

The sociology of rational choice is based on the theory of social exchange and economic theories of rational choice. The concept of rational action of individuals is transferred to the behavior of the whole system, consisting of the same individuals. The idea to transfer the principles of methodological individualism to the level of corporate actors was born in response to the inability of economists to explain such economic phenomena as stock market panics or trust relationships in mutual lending societies.

The direction of economic sociology, which is being formed within the framework of the network approach, reveals a meaningful connection with the structural theory of exchange by Marcel Mauss and Claude Levi-Strauss. In this theory, the modern economy is presented as a set of social networks - stable connections between individuals and firms that cannot be squeezed into the framework of the traditional market-hierarchy dichotomy. These networks of formal and informal relationships allow you to find work, exchange information, resolve conflict situations, and build trust. Economic relations are thus closely aligned with social ones.

A new institutionalism in sociology appears in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Network connections between individuals and firms are presented as multiple, multi-valued, subject to various interpretations and assessments by economic agents. Institutions here are understood not as abstract norms and values, but as formal and informal rules that govern the practices of daily activities and are supported by these practices. Within the framework of American sociology, the new institutionalism is developing in two main directions: culturally oriented and power oriented. In France, a new French institutionalism is actively developing.

19. Family as a social institution and a small social group

The family is an integral unit of society, and it is impossible to reduce its importance. Not a single nation, not a single civilized society could do without a family. The foreseeable future of society is also not conceivable without a family. For every person, the family is the beginning of the beginning. Almost every person associates the concept of happiness, first of all, with the family: happy is the one who is happy in his home.

The classical definition of a family says that a family is a small social group whose members are connected by marriage, parenthood and kinship, common life, a common budget and mutual moral responsibility.

The family is one of the most ancient social institutions. It arose much earlier than religion, state, army, education, market.

Of course, there is a close relationship between the concepts of “marriage” and “family”. Not without reason in the literature of the past, and sometimes of the present, they are often used as synonyms. However, in the essence of these concepts there is not only a general, but also a lot of special, specific. So, scientists have convincingly proved that marriage and the family arose in different historical periods. The family is a more complex system of relations than marriage, since, as a rule, it unites not only spouses, but also their children, as well as other relatives or just those close to spouses and the people they need. The methodological basis for understanding the reasons that encourage people to unite in family groups, create stable connections and interactions, is human needs.

The structure of human needs, according to the model of the American psychologist A. Maslow, is divided into:

1) Physiological and sexual needs;

2) The need for the security of its existence;

3) Social needs for communication;

4) Prestigious need for recognition;

5) Spiritual needs for self-realization;

The essence of the family is considered, first of all, through its functions. The concept of “family functions” reflects the system of interaction between the family and society, as well as the family and the individual. Under the functions of the family is understood as a way of manifesting the activity of the life of the family and its members.

Phenomena and processes, as well as interactions between them and their relationships, functioning and development. The specificity of sociology as a science is that it studies every manifestation of human activity in a social context, i.e. in interconnection with society as a whole, in the interaction of various parties, levels of this social system. Sorokin P. - “Sociology studies phenomena...

Public system; secondly, to identify internal relationships and patterns specific to the subject area. Social sociological theories provide answers to the actual problems of our time. Applied sociology, like theoretical sociology, is an integral part of a unified social development. But unlike the part that studies and theoretically reflects the fundamental, general, basic ...

Your forgiveness. For character - let's say, not a gift, For careless words, And for the fact that I tormented you a lot I am the abbreviation "BSK". 3. Peculiarities and Development of the Ural School of Sociology The Ural School "declared" itself in a number of ways. ü Within its framework, there was a parallel development of three "branches" of Russian sociology at once - university, academic, industrial (factory), ...

Whether it be material objects, socio-political processes, the interests of the population, or anything else that lives outside the subjective consciousness of postmodern correspondents. We have come to the question of similarities and differences between sociology and journalism. Paradoxically, the affinity of these forms of cognition and reflection of the world is based on the fact that they provide an approximate (from a mathematical point of view) ...

The applied methods and approaches are determined by the goals set by the researchers. In the very general view according to the goals of research, the work of sociologists can be divided into academic, knowledge-increasing, and applied, aimed at solving specific practical problems and performed on request. Sociologists' research has a goal in the first place describe social reality and explain its phenomena and processes, and this corresponds to the status of sociology as a positive (O. Comte) and empirical science. Much less frequently, sociologists set themselves the task of predictions, predicting development, and some fundamentally refuse it, like M. Weber, who described the typology of entrepreneurship and explained the reasons for the emergence of various historical types, but fundamentally refrained from predicting their historical future. Economists, on the contrary, set themselves the goals of explanation and prediction, and are much less involved in describing economic processes.

Methodologically, economic sociology is, like sociology in general, polyparadigm discipline which expands its cognitive possibilities. Usage structural paradigms allows you to explore systemic and functional problems at the macro level, for example, the place of the economic subsystem in the system of society, development processes - socio-economic modernization, evolution and features various forms socio-economic structure, for example, the transition from industrial capitalism to financial (R. Schiller), from "organized" capitalism to "disorganized" (J. Urry, S. Lash). Interpretive paradigms successfully applied to microlevel interpretation of motivation, the "life world" of an economic person, the social nature of economic action. Unifying paradigms make it possible to combine macro- and micro-levels of analysis, which is necessary, in particular, when studying networks of relations between market participants, structures of market segments as socio-economic fields in which participants fight for the redistribution of specific capitals, etc. Postmodern paradigms with post-non-classical methodologies are used to study symbolic and simulative relations in a variety of modern economic practices, the phenomena of playing in foreign exchange and other markets, wherever we encounter the absence of classical forms of rationality, causality, with non-linear forms of dynamics, with self-organization and spontaneity.

Economic sociology makes use of the rich and varied set of methods used by sociological science, including both theoretical and empirical methods of research and knowledge augmentation. The former include general scientific methods of synthesis, comparison, generalization, classification, typology, historical genetic analysis, as well as the inductive method of drawing conclusions. To obtain empirical data, as in economics, a secondary analysis of statistical data is used. However, a feature of economic sociology, in contrast to economic science, is the development of special sampling methods, focused on the specifics of specific projects. Among them, the most common are quantitative methods based on a formalized mathematical apparatus for data processing. These include, first of all, questionnaire surveys, on the basis of which sociologists obtain quantitative data that make it possible to assess and describe the trends of social processes, their scale, and also to make forecasts of their development.

Unlike economic theory, sociologists use qualitative methods - in-depth interviews, focus groups, participant observation, discourse analysis, etc. It should be noted that these methods are "soft", do not use mathematical methods, and largely involve the interpretation of the researcher. The data obtained with their help make it possible to identify the specifics of social phenomena and processes, the meanings of people's actions, opinions and assessments that affect the nature of their actions, although they do not make it possible to assess quantitative characteristics - prevalence, frequency, trends in the development of certain facts.

A striking example of the use of qualitative methods in economic sociology is the work of the modern American researcher V. Zelizer, who uses a qualitative analysis of texts - journal articles, letters, diaries, etc. – when studying the life insurance markets, the social meanings of money, even the decision to have a child. Participant observation methods are used in studies of various forms of economic behavior - labor, financial, organizational.

Since modern scientific knowledge tends to increase the mobility of interdisciplinary boundaries, economic sociology often uses the methods and approaches of other humanities - social anthropology, social psychology, stories. Even M. Weber, in his studies of the socio-cultural and spiritual prerequisites for the formation of capitalist entrepreneurship, used the analysis of texts and historical typologies of various forms of economic activity. The German sociologist W. Sombrath also actively used the approach, now considered as an early version of the phenomenological one, and methods of analyzing various documents - diaries, historical chronicles, philosophical treatises. In the studies of the modern American scientist M. Abolafia, with the help of observations and in-depth interviews, the interpretations of the markets and the corresponding roles by stockbrokers are described.

There are many misconceptions associated with understanding what economic sociology is. Therefore, we will first draw the initial boundaries separating it from economic theory. Next, we formulate the subject of economic sociology, define the principles on which the construction of models of the “sociological person” in economics can be based, and analyze the complex relationship between economic theory and economic sociology.

On interdisciplinary boundaries. It is known that in economics and medicine everyone considers themselves to be specialists. A similar fate, we think, will soon befall sociology. For it is difficult to get rid of the impression that sociology deals with phenomena that are often considered "natural" and about which we usually do not bother to think, perceiving them at the level of common sense. Economists, by the way, are quite satisfied with this logic of common sense. Deriving economic motives from a person's individual economic interest, they tacitly assume that such behavior corresponds to his "natural state", innate inclinations and instincts 1 104 . We can say that the intentions of the two disciplines are directly opposite: economic theory produces a reduction to the ordinary, and economic sociology - “deletion” of the ordinary. From a sociological point of view, the most familiar things only seem "natural". Indeed, how to answer the following “simple” questions: why do consumers go to different stores and pay completely different prices for the same thing? Why Entrepreneurs Try to Choose business partners from a strictly defined circle? Why do employees react jealously to even a tiny increase in the pay of their colleagues, but calmly perceive large gaps in income between “rank-and-file” and “bosses”?

First, universal psycho-physiological and moralizing explanations for such behavior are sought. In particular, why do labor conflicts arise? They answer: because a subconscious aggressive principle is inherent in human nature. Or why, say, people work “in a slipshod manner”, even if it threatens them with obvious material losses? Again, there is an explanation: because a person is lazy and spoiled by nature. But at least one flaw in this kind of explanation catches the eye even after minimal thought: it does not take into account the fact that serious changes are undoubtedly taking place in people's behavior. What is their source, since the main driving forces are initially set by human nature? It is known, for example, that for centuries there was a certain rigid division of economic roles in household between a man and a woman, and it was considered "natural". And then “suddenly” gave a lot of cracks, and the roles began to mix intensively. Where did the "naturalness" go?

This point needs some initial clarity: sociology does not deal with what is called "human nature". She is interested in the actions of people as members of society, teaching each other the social norms of behavior that are part of certain social groups and organizational structures. Figure of a man taking independent rational decisions, historical and presupposes the existence of civil freedom and elementary rights of private ownership of resources. Thus, rationalism and selfishness are equally the product of complex social conditions surrounding a person, not reducible to his “nature” or “common sense”. Moreover, these conditions themselves do not remain unchanged. They are constantly reproduced as a result of social interactions. And what we consider ordinary today, once simply did not exist.

So where do they lie borders between two disciplines? Perhaps the object of study is different? This is partly true. economic theory in much more studies relations embodied in the flows of material, financial, information resources, finished products and services. Sociology, on the other hand, is more focused directly on human behavior and social relations as such. But the intersection of the objects of study is still quite large.

Perhaps the main difference is rooted in the methods of data collection and analysis used by economic theory and economic sociology? And there are such differences. Economists are increasingly striving to improve the predictive power of their models by dressing them in rigorous mathematical forms. They may not refer to empirical material at all, and if they do, they most often use ready-made aggregates of national statistics. Sociologists, as a rule, emphasize descriptive (descriptive) analysis. Their models are less rigorous in a formal sense, but more often they are tested on specific empirical data, which are selective in nature and are drawn from specially organized sources. Polls 2 105 are considered to be the main sociological methods of data collection. But in general, sociologists demonstrate a greater variety of these methods than economists, including also participant observation, in-depth interviews, biographical method, content analysis 3 106 .

Despite the traditionally established differences in the methods used, the main interdisciplinary watershed should not be found here. Of course, economists are less likely to resort to survey methods and less sophisticated in survey techniques. But this path is by no means ordered to them. And many economists today are increasingly using survey data (this is especially true for Russia with chronic weaknesses in its official statistics, where a special survey is often the only source of necessary data). In turn, many sociologists do not shy away from statistical information. One should also not go far in contrasting economists and sociologists, believing that the former operate with “pure models”, while the latter “dig into empiricism”. There are many scrupulous empiricists among economists, and many sociologists look at the earth from a bird's eye view. In other words, the difference in the techniques of data collection and analysis is secondary, it hides a deeper and more significant difference - in the general methodological premises of analysis, in approaches to modeling human action, arising from completely heterogeneous foundations.

Thus, speaking of economic sociology, we will henceforth have in mind something that is fundamentally opposed to the economic approach, even in cases where the research object and data collection methods coincide. We will talk about the “sociology of economic action” (M. Weber) or the “sociology of economic life” (N. Smelser), i.e. about using the basic concepts of sociological theory for the analysis of economic relations.

Subject of economic sociology. Let us now try to give an initial formulation of the subject matter of economic sociology. We define it in the spirit of M. Weber: economic sociology studies economic action as a form of social action 4 107 . “Economic action” represents the exercise of control over limited resources by non-violent methods in order to satisfy their needs. A "social action" - this is a form of activity, which, firstly, contains an internal subjective semantic unity; secondly, according to this meaning, it correlates with the actions of other people and is guided by these actions. In other words, we are dealing with social action when (and only when) it is internally motivated, and its subject expects a certain response from other people (the latter is expressed not only in observed behavior, but also in mental activity or even in the rejection of any action) 5 108 . Social action in this interpretation is the basis and at the same time an internal element of economic action.

When a street vendor lays out his simple goods on a stall, he expects that people approaching him are aware of the functions of money and the structure of prices, the quality and properties of the goods offered, the forms of civilized exchange, in particular, the permissibility of stall trading. All this allows the trader to expect that his activity will be recognized, and he will not be awarded “stoning”, but an adequate material reward. Like the merchant mentioned above, we all tend to be guided by the actions of other people and refer to the norms of the community in which we given time we stay, waiting for a previously known reaction to our actions. If it's not customary to haggle in a large supermarket, we don't; if in a given professional group it is not customary to “hack”, then strict control over the work of its members is apparently unnecessary, and so on. We “absorb” these norms so much that, without hesitation, we automatically continue to follow them even when we do not risk being in the field of view of those who could condemn us for violations.

The disclosure of the subject of economic sociology through the Weberian categories of economic and social action defines this subject from the standpoint of methodological individualism. And it is important to immediately make a reservation that the latter differs sharply from the methodological individualism adopted in economic theory. The individualism of homoeconomicus is directly associated with its atomism, with the relative independence of the decisions made and the establishment of an indirect social connection - mainly through the correlation of the results of action. Sociological individualism is a phenomenon of a different methodological order. The individual is considered here in the totality of his social connections and inclusion in heterogeneous social structures. Society in this case does not just float as an abstract premise, but is visibly present in the fabric of individual action. All sociological individualism is thus highly relative. And it is legitimate to call Weber's approach individualism as opposed to, say, E. Durkheim's holism. Against the background of the teachings of neoclassical economists, such a definition turns out to be very conditional.

Recognition of the social rootedness of economic action means, firstly, that its motives go beyond economic goals, and secondly, that these motives are the product of the functioning of the social community, and not the preferences of an isolated individual 6 109 . On their basis, social communities include:

Networks of interpersonal communication;

Organizational structures;

Social groups;

national communities.

Social action is realized in three key types of relations: economic, cultural, power. Each community can be built on any of them, and most often it includes all three types of relations, none of which has a clear priority, be it market exchange, common norms and values, or power interdependencies.

Our further task is to show, firstly, that economic relations absorb cultural and power elements; and secondly, that the ways of a person's economic activity, his economic expectations and orientations are largely determined by his belonging to different social communities. This problem will be solved throughout the book. In the following sections, we will meet the figures of the entrepreneur and the manager, the wage worker and the domestic worker, those who create organizations and enter into ready-made structures, form social groups and are part of national communities. All of them not only produce and consume economic goods, but also look for information, pass on accumulated experience, earn credibility and construct new meanings for the economic process. Their actions are generated by social structures and themselves, in turn, "create" these structures. In the first section, we do not pretend to fully disclose the subject of economic sociology (without a meaningful presentation of the key topics, this is hardly possible). Rather, we are talking about a sketch of the subject field, giving the first understanding of its boundaries 7 110 .

Construction of an economic and sociological model. What principles can underlie the construction of a sociological model of economic action? Economists have their own solution to this problem. Particularly important in this case is the position of V. Pareto, who “divorced” economic theory and sociology, proposing that the former study “logical actions”, and the second, “the logical study of non-logical actions” 8 111 . P. Samuelson gave this difference a canonical character. And it is enshrined in the witty aphorism of the economist J. Duesenberry: “The whole of economic theory is devoted to how people make choices; and the whole of sociology is devoted to why people have no choice” 9 112 .

What does a “sociological person” look like with this approach? He is considered as the complete antipode of homoeconomicus. If the latter is, say, a person who is independent, selfish, rational and competent, then homosociologicus is a person who obeys social norms and is altruistic, behaves irrationally and inconsistently, is poorly informed and is not capable of calculating benefits and costs. Let's look at a variant of such a comparison of two models. Homoeconomicus is represented by economists K. Brunner and W. Meckling: it is “a resourceful, estimating, maximizing man” (Resourceful, Evaluating, MaximizingMan, or REMM model) 10 113 . And the “sociological person” is described by the model proposed by S. Lindenberg: it is “a socialized person, performing roles, whose behavior is sanctioned by society” (Socialized, Role-Playing, SanctionedMan, or the SRSM model) 11 114 .

Having chosen this path, it remains to formalize the sociological model in order to give it a more “working” look. For example, one can apply the same marginalist approaches and present homosociologicus as a maximizer of the degree of one's own socialization and a minimizer of the uncertainty associated with its incomplete inclusion in social norms. Bringing such a model to quantitative certainty is, of course, not easy. But if successful, the economic model will have a related construction, acquiring its own mathematical apparatus. As a result, along with the “economic automaton”, we will get another one - the “sociological automaton”, more outlandish and, perhaps, less attractive - dumb and passive. No wonder that there is a temptation to cut off the sociological pole (for example, K. Brunner is sure that “the REMM model provides a unified approach for the social sciences”) 12 115 .

Is it possible to synthesize "polar" models, do we have the right to hope for the emergence of some kind of "socio-economic man"?

After all, if the two models are fundamentally incomparable, if homoeconomicus and homosociologicus move in strictly parallel courses, then the very existence of economic sociology is called into question.

Let's assume that the location of these two models on a common axis or several common axes is possible. The first way to synthesize them is a simple addition (in one combination or another) of the opposite qualities attributed to a person. Such mechanical addition leads to the “collapse” of the poles. The second, more subtle logical move is to find a compromise point on the axis between the two poles by the method of mutual approach and concessions. It is this point in this case that should indicate the address of the “socio-economic person”, who, by virtue of his intermediate position, acquires certain additional qualities(for example, the ability not only to make strong-willed decisions or limply follow established norms, but to coordinate one's actions with the actions of others) 13 116 . Indeed, methodological reflection involuntarily leads economists and sociologists to such convergence. Nevertheless, we do not consider this path to be particularly promising, because the problem itself, in our opinion, should be posed differently.

Like most sociologists, we are unable to open our arms to the oversocialized antipode of "economic man." And therefore we proceed from the assumption that homosociologicus does not stand at the extreme opposing point, but “floats” in a continuum between two poles, one of which has already been called “economic man”, and the other can be conditionally called “social man”. But if sociology seeks man not at some particular point, but along the entire continuum, then this means that “sociological man” can only be represented as a whole gallery of figures, through a series of types of action. In this sense, homoeconomicus and homosociologicus are not two adjacent types of action. Homosociologicus encompasses a broader class of models in which "economic man" and "social man" become extreme cases.

Placing a person on a continuum between extreme, radical positions not only presupposes the removal of the rigid opposition of these two types of action, but also gives it a more active subjective principle. We are talking about a person who is not just informed, but knows; not just following the norms, but socializing. And the point is not even (more precisely, not only) that a person as an active subject can in some cases behave rationally, independently or selfishly, and in others - show altruism or follow traditional norms. Man is capable act contrary to(todootherwise) obvious rationality or established norms, “switch” from one mode to another (spontaneously or as a result of volitional efforts), moving from the logic of economically oriented to the logic of socially oriented action, and vice versa.

As a result, economic sociology faces at least two methodological problems. The first is construction, instead of a single model, typologies(taxonomies) on a range of scales linking (and at the same time contrasting) economically and socially oriented actions. Thus, the homoeconomicus model is not rejected by economic sociology. On the contrary, it is taken as one of the key working models for typological constructions, but it is not considered as the only or dominant one.

The second methodological task of economic sociology is to define and disclose the social and economic conditions, under which mutual transition of economically and socially oriented actions. For example, what motivates an entrepreneur who earns money by any available and inaccessible means to subsequently transfer it to the needs of an orphanage? Or why does the worker, whom everyone considered the “soul of the team,” violate all norms of decency when sharing a scarce good (bonus, higher position)?

History of interdisciplinary relations. Let us now turn to the question of the relationship between economic theory and economic sociology in a historical aspect. The development of related disciplines does not necessarily occur synchronously. And we can put forward the following important hypothesis: economic theory and economic sociology go through similar periods(stages), however, the second one lags behind the first by one conditional step, those. each time is at the previous stage. If this hypothesis is sound, it would help to explain why, in many cases, the initial methodological impulses come from the depths of economic theory, and the economic-sociological moves look more like responses. In the historical aspect, with all the inevitable simplifications, the picture of the relationship between the two disciplines is as follows.

1. Period initial synthesis(end of XVIII - middle of XIX centuries) 14 117 . The classical stage in political economy (from A. Smith to J.S. Mill) is accompanied from the first half of the 19th century. the initial design of sociology as a “positive science” (O. Comte). Sociology makes its first claims to an integrating role, but economic questions are not seriously considered by it. In the field of future economic sociology, economists of a sense alternative to liberal political economy (socialists, the old German historical school, F. List) are still working. There are still no clear boundaries between the two disciplines, arbitrary interdisciplinary transitions and borrowings are carried out.

2. Period mutual isolation(late XIX - early XX centuries). The neoclassical stage in economic theory begins: the marginalist revolution (W. Jevons, L. Walras, K. Menger), the Austrian school, A. Marshall. There is a separation of the economy as a professional branch of knowledge, the creation of its working apparatus. At the same time, the classical foundations of economic sociology are being laid (K. Marx, E. Durkheim, M. Weber). Despite efforts to build bridges (M. Weber on the part of sociology, J. Schumpeter on the part of economic theory), elements of parallelism in the movement of the two disciplines are intensifying. The tendency towards specialization, methodological and professional demarcation is stronger than all attempts at synthesis.

3. Period mutual disregard(30s - mid-60s of the XX century). There is a stage of maturity of economic theory with the separation of its main branches (macro- and microeconomics) and theoretical directions (liberal and Keynesian, behavioral and institutional). At the same time, a neoclassical stage was unfolding in the development of economic sociology and its formation as a professional branch with a special conceptual and methodological apparatus (the theoretical branch was represented by T. Parsons and other functionalists, the empirical branch - by industrial sociology). Neither economists nor sociologists, by and large, are interested in what is happening in the "neighboring camp" and rarely intrude into other people's areas 15 118 .

4. Period "economic imperialism"(mid 60s - 80s). Economic theory is going through a crisis associated with a partial revision of the premises (rational choice theory, new institutional theory). At the same time, attempts are being made to broadly expand into related areas of the social sciences (H. Becker, J. Buchanan, C. Arrow, and others). Meanwhile, economic sociology is entering a period of professional maturity. On the basis of the opposition of the functionalist gran theory and mutual repulsion, the development of “several sociologies” is taking place - neo-Marxist, neo-Weberian, phenomenological. The “new economic sociology” (M. Granovetter) and “socio-economics” (A. Etzioni) appear as a response to the first chaotic, and then more and more organized offensive of economists.

5. Stage "sociological imperialism"(90s). There is a certain fragmentation and reshaping of economic theory. At the same time, a massive blow is being organized by economic sociology, which is attempting to reinterpret economic concepts and categories in an ever-increasing number of research areas.

Of course, in the above picture (as in any general scheme) a lot of coarsening and non-disputable things. On closer examination, it is not difficult to identify a lot of chronological overlaps. In each period, lateral branches arise that complicate the overall picture (for example, the young German historical school, the first American institutionalists, etc.). The names assigned by us do not exhaust the content of each stage.

Many judgments require specific justification. Nevertheless, without claiming absolute accuracy, the proposed scheme is still able, in our opinion, to reflect certain trends in the development of both economic theory and economic sociology, as well as to stimulate our understanding of their relationship in a given period (see Fig. table 1).

And what about the relationship between economists and sociologists? According to R. Svedberg, they have always been very difficult 16 119 . Mutual disregard, up to hostility, and at best a polemical struggle with claims to a priority role, in fact, never stopped. There are methodological reasons here, caused by direct subject intersections. But, of course, this is not the only thing. There is a struggle for a “place in the sun” - for prestige in the community, for being considered the “main” explanatory and predictive science, and finally, not least, for the amount of funding and the number of places in universities.

Sociologists themselves have more than once unleashed disputes with economists (O. Comte in the middle of the 19th century, A. Small - at the turn of the century, T. Parsons - in the middle of the twentieth century). However, it must be said that in such disputes, from the point of view of the scientific community, sociology, as a rule, lost to economic theory. And not only because, as an independent discipline, sociology is younger. The main reason, it seems to us, is rooted in the steady reproduction of positivist standards of what can and should be considered "science". From the point of view of the requirements of evaluative neutrality and rigor of empirical verification of judgments, the use of complex mathematical and statistical models, economic theory undoubtedly had and has more chances to present itself in the role of “true science”.

In addition, political and ideological factors also played their role. It is believed that among sociologists there are too many people of "left" beliefs. Indeed, neo-Marxism of various kinds retains fairly strong positions in sociology. The attitude towards the “leftists” is reserved even on the European continent, and in the universities of the United States they were simply treated. So the matter is not limited to purely scientific debates. And today calls for the unity of the best economic and sociological forces are still largely good wishes.

Conclusion. The scientific community of economists, despite the tendencies towards the fragmentation of economic theory, continues to be a more powerful and cohesive corporation compared to sociologists. The observed intensive development of economic and sociological research in many respects acts as a critical reaction to the schemes proposed by economists. Sociological approaches significantly expand and enrich our vision of economic processes. However, this comes at the cost of a partial loss of accuracy and certainty. And the very models of behavior of the “sociological person” in economic life are still very vaguely formulated.

Y. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk

Odessa National Economic University

METHODOLOGICAL BASES OF ANALYSIS

CREATIVE ACTIVITIES IN

OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY

Relevance of the issue

The relevance of this issue is determined primarily by those

shifts in the content of labor, which led to the emergence of

historical arena of the "new middle class", occupying an intermediate

position between workers and employers and called the "creative class". According to its "discoverer" Richard Florida (who was nicknamed "Marx without a beard"), with the formation of a "creative class" that unites more than 30% of the US workforce, "profound and significant changes are associated with our habits and methods of work, values ​​and aspirations , as well as in the very structure of our Everyday life"(19, p.12). As shown by a large-scale study conducted by R. Florida together with I. Tinagli, similar processes are taking place in Europe. In terms of the total number of people employed in the creative industries, Russia ranks second in the world after the United States (24, pp. 17-21).

However, R. Florida's works are not a panegyric to the "creative class". Florida criticizes the "creative class" for infantilism, irresponsibility and failure to fulfill their leadership obligations. Although this hurts the ear, the author encourages him to develop a class consciousness. The main pathos of his works is: the “creative class” has gained strength and now must identify itself and take responsibility into its own hands (23, p. 9).

This problem is especially relevant today for Russia, where the “creative class” is forced to immediately join the political struggle and form the core of opposition to the regime, without having yet developed its own political self-consciousness, without understanding what it actually needs and what it will do Yu. Kozak, A Grimadyuk after Putin's departure. Hence the mostly negative nature of his political demands, which essentially boil down to “Putin, go away” and the complete inability to put forward not only any positive program, but even an acceptable plan of action. This was one of the reasons for the defeat of the first mass protests of the opposition. The failure of these speeches clearly confirms that the theme of "history and class consciousness" once declared by G. Lukacs, which has long ceased to be relevant for the working class, is becoming today more relevant than any other topic for the "creative class".

These difficulties are not accidental. Epistemologically, they are to a certain extent connected with the economic and sociological underdevelopment not only of the theory of the “creative class”, but also of the problems creative activity in the modern economy, which prevents the "creative class"

to realize their place in society and their role in the processes of its development.

The significance of these extremely complex issues determines the particular relevance of the search for methodological foundations for the analysis of creative activity carried out within the framework of economic sociology.

Statement of the problem and the purpose of reasoning In the literature, in addition to the works of R. Florida, the works of Charles Landry "Creative City" and Hawkins "Creative Economy" also caused a significant resonance. As for the more categorical development of these issues, the post-Marxist trend is currently leading here. It considers creative activity as a process of direct, unalienated cooperation, dialogue, co-creation of subjects of activity. Post-Marxism proceeds from the fact that in order to be included in such subject-subject relations, personal abilities to “objectify and disobjectify” the results of creativity and open, not limited by private property access to cultural values ​​are needed (6; 4; 3; 7; 13; 12; 1 , pp. 27-29). The so-called “post-industrial socialism” (5) also adjoins post-Marxism.

At the same time, the approach from the point of view of alternative possibilities of individual choice, which dominates in economic theory, is not actually applied to the solution of these theoretical issues. This hinders the establishment of interdisciplinary links between economic sociology and economic theory.

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The purpose of the article is an attempt to consider the problems of creative activity from the standpoint of alternative possibilities of individual choice and thereby build a bridge between economic theory and economic sociology.

At the same time, we proceed from the fact that economic sociology cannot afford to ignore the problems of the "creative class" in the same way that economic theory actually did (with the exception, perhaps, of P. Romer's "new theory of growth"). Economics is not interested in where alternative possibilities come from. By taking this question out of the scope of its subject, modern economic theory thereby actually transfers it to the jurisdiction of economic sociology, which, by the very nature of its subject, is called upon to consider not only the use of alternative possibilities, but also their creation.

Economic and creative activities

Such a distinction between the subject of analysis is not unreasonable. It proceeds from the real difference between economic and creative activity.

Economic activity includes two stages: 1) the choice of a certain variant of activity from known alternatives; 2) the implementation of this option, the objectification of the activity as a result, that is, labor. As you know, Marx emphasized labor, the objectification of activity, that is, he focused on the second stage of economic activity. Modern economic theory, on the contrary, focuses on the first stage of economic activity, on the problem of choice.

However, this shift in emphasis from labor to choice is clearly not enough for an adequate analysis of the modern economy. The fact is that in this case, economic theory actually excludes from its subject creative activity that can create new alternative choices. As a result, all attention is one-sidedly fixed on the analysis of choice, and not on the creation of new opportunities for it, which forms the starting point of the complex activity characteristic of modern economics. In order to categorically express the features of a modern developed economy, it is necessary to shift the emphasis not from labor action to choice, but from choice - to creating new options for it and, consequently, from economic activity to creative activity.

Yu. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk In the economic activity of a classical individual producer (“simple commodity producer”), entrepreneurial choice and labor impact on the object of labor are combined in one person, but this activity itself is usually actually separated from creativity that creates new alternative options for action. As a result of this social division of activity, actions separated from creativity are of a routine nature. The development of small-scale production is slow. It is not surprising, therefore, that it proved incapable of resisting capitalist production, which presupposes entrepreneurship separated from direct labour.

Capitalist entrepreneurship means the relative separation of choice from labor. The entrepreneur focuses on the function of economic choice, the worker - mainly on direct action, acting as labor. In classical capitalist production, choice and labor are separated.

The choice becomes the prerogative of the entrepreneur, and labor is assigned to the hired worker.

This new, specifically capitalist, social division of activity into separate and opposing labor action and entrepreneurial choice has received a peculiar expression in economic thought. On the one hand, based on the labor theory of value, Marxist political economy focuses on labor as an action directed directly at a material object. At the same time, the subjective economic choice is relegated to the background. On the other hand, the Austrian and neoclassical schools arose, focusing on the problem of economic choice and considering the labor action only as one of the production resources or factors of production.

Modern economic theory places a special objectivity between the material world and the world of "praxeological reality" - alternative possibilities of human activity.

“Praxeological reality is not the physical world,” emphasizes L. Mises, “but the conscious reaction of a person to a given state of this world. Economic theory is not a science of objects and tangible material objects; it is the science of people, their intentions and actions. Goods, commodities, wealth, and all other concepts of behavior are not elements of nature; they are elements of human intentions and behavior. Whoever wants to study them need not look at the outside world; he must look for them in the intentions of acting people (14, p. 89).

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Unlike Fichte's radical activism, Mises' praxeology does not seek to deny the objective existence of the material world; it is generally methodologically indifferent to the objectivity of its existence. It is interested in completely different, ideal objects of human activity - alternative possibilities from which the economic subject makes his choice, and not in the materiality of those things with which these alternative possibilities are associated. As a result of its interest not in material, but primarily in ideal objects of human activity or phenomena of activity (by analogy with Husserl's understanding of the phenomenon as an intentional object), Austrian praxeology, in contrast to the Marxist activity approach, acts as a kind of phenomenology of human activity.

It is hardly accidental that, in parallel with the penetration into the economic theory of the "Austrian" in its origin, the concept of opportunity costs, considered as the costs of lost alternative opportunities, the concept of intentional objects developed by E. Husserl has entered into modern thinking.

The phenomenological reduction of E. Husserl, like the methodological doubt of Descartes, proceeds from the certainty of the fact of consciousness. But, if consciousness is indubitable, then, consequently, that to which it is directed is also indubitable. After all, it is impossible to break the act of consciousness in half. There is no intentionality, no direction without what it is directed at.

This means that in the consciousness of the transcendental subject there are not only acts of thinking, but also those objects to which these acts are directed.

Husserl was mainly interested in cognition, and not in practical activity, although in principle intentional objects can be considered as objects not only of cognition, but also of practical, in particular, economic activity. However, Husserl did not focus on activity as Fichte did. Therefore, in his intentional objects act as images of material things, to which the consciousness of the cognizing, and not actively acting, subject is directed.

As a result of such actually assumed inaction of the cognizing subject, it makes no sense to consider alternative possibilities of action as a special class of intentional objects that are no longer objects of contemplation, but of choice. If we assume that the subject is not contemplating, but acting, then a completely new category of intentional objects arises - intentional objects of choice, which are alternative possibilities of action. Identification by Yu. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk of this special, "activity" class of intentional objects can open up new perspectives and significantly expand the scope of the activity approach in economic sociology.

If, in accordance with the approach of modern economic theory, we consider economic activity primarily as an individual choice, then the intentional objects of such a choice are precisely alternative possibilities. They form that very phenomenological objectivity, that “praxeological reality” from which modern economic theory begins to study. Such a phenomenological understanding of objectivity is actually inherent in modern economic theory in its neo-Austrian, neoclassical, and neo-institutional variants.

Take, for example, the neo-institutional theory of property rights.

Generally speaking, property rights, that is, the rights of individuals to use resources (21, p. 47), are a historically defined social form of the possibility for an individual to choose his actions.

Market transaction, that is, the exchange of property rights, is a specific social form of exchange of these opportunities.

Property is considered in the neo-institutional theory in the spirit of Anglo-Saxon law - as a bundle, a set of powers. In turn, each authority represents a certain set of opportunities that open up to its owner. Consequently, the exchange of property rights, powers - this is ultimately an exchange of opportunities. R. Coase emphasizes that “in the market they do not trade in material objects, as economists often assume, but in the rights to carry out certain actions” (8, p. 348). Each competence expands the possibilities of the subject, his choice. Thus, A. Alchian defines the system of property rights as “a set of methods for granting “authorities” to specific individuals to choose any way of using specific goods from the class of non-prohibited ways of using these goods” (22, p. 130)1.

This, however, was well understood by the founder of the activity approach himself. Fichte characterizes “the right of ownership as a right that excludes actions, not things. It happens like this. As long as everyone lives quietly next to each other, there will be no disputes between them. Only for the first time, when they begin to show themselves in activity, do they collide with each other. Free activity is the source of the struggle of forces. She, therefore, is the subject on which the disputants must agree;

this activity, not the thing, is the subject of the contract. Ownership of the object of free activity follows and is derived from the exclusive right to free activity. I will not tire myself in devising means for the perfect possession of this tree, if none of those who approach it touch it, and if only

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Accordingly, the exchange of goods is considered in the neo-institutional theory not as an exchange of material objects, but as an exchange of property rights, that is, in other words, as an exchange of opportunities to act in a certain way in relation to these objects. This exchange of opportunities forms the content of market transactions, and the costs of this exchange of property rights form transaction costs.

However, there is not only an exchange of opportunities, but also the creative creation of fundamentally new opportunities. These creative possibilities make it much more difficult to determine ownership.

“For example, the introduction of new technical means, such as a car, photocopiers, computers, videotapes, often creates uncertainty about property rights, as a result of which rights that have value remain in the public “property sector” (21, p.53) .

Determining for the mode of exchange is its intentional object, that is, what kind of alternative possibilities are exchanged. In this sense, the exchange object determines the mode of exchange.

Free interpersonal exchange is adequate for personal, creatively created opportunities. Market transactions are adequate to social opportunities, but not to all, but only to those social opportunities that have an exclusive, competitive use.

Their use by one subject precludes their use by another.

“Enforcing property rights involves the exclusion of other persons from the number of users of limited resources” (21, p. 49). However, in the specific historical form of property rights, only a part of social possibilities appears, while the other part is open for general use2.

The neo-institutional theory of property rights considers the exchange of goods as an exchange of property rights, that is, as a market, I alone am supposed to harvest the fruits of it when I want. ... Thus, on the basis of an agreement between all and all, the sphere of free activity is distributed among individual individuals, and property arises from this division” (18, p. 260).

“As soon as we deal with information, “products” of spiritual production, leaving the world of material, finite wealth, we enter the sphere of public property. Since there is no finiteness in the field of spiritual production and information, it means that there is no place for private property either. … In a post-industrial (information) society, the possession of private property and its size depend primarily on how and to what extent a person is included in the sphere of public property: the more he is attached to knowledge and information, the higher his material well-being” (9, p. 192 -193).

Yu. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk transaction. A transaction is not an exchange of things, but of alternative possibilities, i.e., intentional rather than material objects. Here, neo-institutionalism is in solidarity with neoclassicism, which, following the Austrian school, replaces the classical analysis of objective cost with an analysis of opportunity costs. All these currents of modern economic thought are based essentially on the analysis of alternative possibilities that are the objects of economic choice.

To such a consideration of economic activity, an understanding of activity as a choice is adequate. In general, activity is not limited to choice. It is legitimate to consider economic activity as a choice from a certain set of conditions given to the subject from the outside. alternatives actions. The economic subject does not create alternative possibilities for his actions. He receives them from the outside, from society in finished form. Therefore, he can only choose from the alternative options offered to him by society.

Unlike economic activity, creativity is not limited to choice, it means relatively independent creation the very subject of new alternative possibilities for their actions.

The degree of this independence determines the measure of the creative content of the activity. It is this relative independence in creating new opportunities that elevates creativity above economic activity, using only those opportunities that society offers.

Generally speaking, a person's awareness of the alternative possibilities of his actions can occur in two ways. On the one hand, a person can learn about their existence from other people, from society, for example, in the course of his upbringing, training, or through any other channels of movement and dissemination of knowledge between people, such as market prices, mass media and communications, advertising, literature. etc. In this case, the individual's awareness of an objectively existing possibility is mediated by society. In this sense, this alternative opportunity appears for the individual as a social opportunity provided to him by society.

But, on the other hand, the subject can not only receive ready-made knowledge of possibilities from other people, but also create new possibilities himself, moreover, possibilities that are new not only for him, but also for other people, for society as a whole. Of course, without society and outside of society, without that objective knowledge that K. Popper calls

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"third world", Marx - "universal labor", and which Plato acts as a world of ideas - the creation of new personal opportunities is extremely difficult. Isolated from objective knowledge, a creative subject would have to invent a bicycle at every step, and not only a bicycle, but even a wheel, which he will not find ready-made in primary, natural nature and can only take from society (10, p. 124). In this sense, any individual creative subject is just "a dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant."

Economic theory and economic sociology. Alternative elections

The subject matter of economic sociology continues where economic theory leaves off. Economic theory is not at all interested in the origin of those alternative possibilities from which the economic subject makes his individual choice. This is not her subject. But this is part of the subject matter of economic sociology, which, like economic theory, cannot afford to limit itself to an analysis of the choice of available alternatives, but must also investigate where these alternative courses of action come from. In this sense, its subject matter is broader than that of economic theory.

Creative activity involves not only choice, but also the creation of new alternative possibilities for it. If economic activity can only be reduced to the first element, then creativity necessarily presupposes the second. Both of these elements are associated with new alternative possibilities: one is with their creation, the other is with their use. Therefore, the category of alternative possibilities is needed to describe not only purely economic activity as a choice, but also to analyze the elements of creativity "dissolved" in practical activity.

Consideration of the objective basis of individual actions requires a few words to be said about the concept of objective knowledge by K. Popper (15, pp. 150-154). At one time, his theory of "three worlds" caused some surprise. After all, Popper is known as an irreconcilable exposer of the "enemies of the open society" of Plato and Hegel. Meanwhile, in his theory of "three worlds", he considers objective knowledge almost by analogy with Marx's concept of "universal labor", meaning, as you know, Yu. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk "any scientific work, any discovery, any invention" and suggesting not only intratemporal, social connection between people, but also intertemporal, universal connection (11, p.116)3.

The world of "universal labor", of which such objective knowledge is a part, forms the most profound, universal basis of the possibilities for people to choose their individual actions. The difference between this general basis of individual action and social relations is best illustrated by the example of Robinson. The point is that Robinson's actions fall out of the social connection, but by no means fall out of the general historical connection. That is why the robinsonade ridiculed by Marxism is the best way to separate the universal basis of individual actions from social relations. Even on a desert island, Robinson's actions are not isolated from all previous human history. For his actions, he has the minimum knowledge, skills and experience that he acquired earlier. Once on a desert island, he nevertheless continues to use this universal basis of his actions. The historical stage in the development of this universal foundation ultimately determines the amount of subjective knowledge that Robinson has at his disposal. If this happened not in the 17th century AD, but in the 17th century. BC, then such an antique Robinson would hardly have been able to use a gun and gunpowder even if by some miracle they were in his hands.

Thus, even being on a desert island, Robinson does not drop out of history. Isolation from society does not mean isolation from all previous human history.

But now he can't buy gunpowder after his supply runs out. On the other hand, on the other hand, he does not have to produce some commodity in exchange for this additional gunpowder in accordance with the socially necessary expenditure of labor. Dropping out of society, he thereby drops out of the world of social relations and finds himself face to face with primary, natural nature and natural necessity. Social relations cease to mediate the connection between the general basis and his individual actions.

Marx writes: “It is necessary to distinguish between general labor and joint labor.

Both play their part in the production process, each of them passes into the other, but there is also a difference between them. Every scientific work, every discovery, every invention is universal labor. It is determined partly by the cooperation of contemporaries, partly by the use of the labor of predecessors. Joint labor presupposes direct cooperation of individuals” (11, p. 116). On creativity as "universal labor" see also: 2, p. 275; 20, p. 235-280.

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He may not add anything essentially new, of universal significance to the knowledge that he already has. Rather, he simply adapts an already existing universal basis for his actions:

he still uses the gun and gunpowder rather than inventing the rifle or machine gun. He does not necessarily expand the universal basis by creating new personal possibilities for his actions. But if Robinson still invents a rifle instead of a gun, then after returning to society, his invention may receive universal recognition. Even if he himself never returns to society, his invention may still receive universal recognition when people sooner or later discover the rifle he created.

One way or another, his work does not fall out of the universal connection between people, does not break away from the universal foundation, since in any case it is based on the already existing and subjectively assimilated by him objective knowledge. But, while inevitably remaining in the sphere of universal connection between people, Robinson at the same time falls out of the system of social relations, from the system of social connection between people maintained in a certain way. However, falling out of the sphere of social relations, his individual actions still continue to rely on their universal basis.

Thus, the personal and socially mediated possibilities of a person's individual choice of his actions act as two opposite forms of using the same universal basis of individual actions. Indirectly universal possibilities are open to all people, but directly people can use them in two opposite forms: perceiving them either as ready-made options for their actions, or as a kind of “material” for the creative creation of new alternative possibilities for their actions.

For example, technology mobile communications is an indispensable component of the universal basis of the individual actions of modern man. Most people realize this universal basis as the mobile communication capabilities provided by modern society, which they use in their daily activities. The set of these alternative possibilities is quite extensive, given that the consumer can choose this or that company, this or that phone, this or that “package”, this or that time, this or that duration of the conversation, he can dial this or that number known to him. , and if desired, may refuse to use mobile services altogether. All these alternative opportunities are public insofar as they are provided by modern society in a “ready-made” form by Yu. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk. Only if a person uses the existing technology of mobile communication as a starting point for its improvement, this technology, as an element of the universal basis of individual actions that has reached the modern level, becomes the "material" for the creative creation of new personal possibilities.

The universal basis of individual actions is mediated by the natural opportunities provided by the primary nature to man. For example, in itself, the primary, natural nature does not give a person the possibility of mobile communication at such distances. In turn, as we see, this universal basis can be used in two alternative ways, acting either as social opportunities or as a direct basis for creating personal opportunities.

It was noted above that the division of labor and choice in capitalist production is antithetical to their direct combination in the economic activity of the individual producer.

At the same time, capitalist entrepreneurship opens up certain opportunities for strengthening the impact on material production from those spheres of spiritual production that were previously almost completely separated from it. This creates the conditions for unprecedented technological and economic development.

Ultimately, this development reaches a stage at which choice and action, entrepreneurship and labor are complemented by the creative creation of new alternative courses of action directly at the level of the corporation, which in this case acts as a scientific and production complex. Moreover, under the influence of corporate connection, these elements begin to connect at the individual level. Individual action, which appears in production as labor, again begins to combine with choice, but now elements of creativity are added to it. Thus, in the historical trend, the denial of the classical capitalist division of economic activity into labor action and entrepreneurial choice begins.

A partial return to their combination begins, but this combination is now beginning to be enriched with elements of creativity that are practically alien to the former individual producer.

The modern innovative economy in this sense acts as the beginning negation of the capitalist separation of choice and action. But this does not mean a return to simple commodity production, but

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rather, a kind of historical synthesis of a simple and capitalist commodity economy in a modern innovative economy. This historical synthesis takes from simple commodity production the reunification of action and choice that begins at the individual level, and from capitalism the addition to these stages of activity of those elements of creativity that were previously practically separated from material production and concentrated in the sphere of spiritual production, separated from material.

The capitalist decomposition of economic activity into choice and action, separate and opposed to each other in the form of class contradiction, turns out to be only a historical condition for the subsequent complication of activity, a prerequisite for adding a creative element to these two elements of economic activity.

In assessing the degree of development of this trend, however, there should be no "running ahead". Creative activity presupposes, first of all, the creative creation of new personal possibilities.

Meanwhile, modern people working in the system of social division of activity specialize either in the more or less creative preparation of new opportunities, which are obviously intended for other people, or in the practical use of these opportunities, which appear to them as ready-made social opportunities. Neither one nor the other has yet a coherent creative activity. Instead of pure, perfect, holistic creativity, we more often observe only elements of creativity, suggesting its fragmentation, fragmentation, as well as its inclusion in the content of labor, which, unlike pure creativity, is subject to economic necessity. Therefore, such a decay into individual elements and creativity included in the content of labor is largely subject to socio-economic necessity. In order to gain social recognition, new opportunities take the form of public, socially mediated opportunities and, in this form, inadequate to their own nature, are drawn into the market mechanism of social recognition. An example of such inadequacy of form and content is intellectual property, which implies the possibility of selling all or part of these property rights and acting as a contradiction in the definition.

The market, abstractly depersonalizing mechanism of social recognition corresponds to the nature of ordinary socially mediated opportunities characteristic of economic activity. At the same time, Yu. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk does not at all correspond to the internal nature of creative results, and even, on the contrary, is directly opposite to it. The form of manifestation of this internal conflict becomes, for example, monopolistic competition associated with product innovations.

There is a conflict between the monopolistic and competitive sides of monopolistic competition. The opposite of these sides is found in the fact that innovation opportunities and competition have a directly opposite effect on the position of the economic system relative to its general equilibrium. If innovations, as shown by J. Schumpeter, push the system away from the position of general economic equilibrium, then competition, on the contrary, tends to bring the system closer to this state.

This conflict of two opposite principles is especially characteristic of the modern economy. With the ever-increasing influence of science, the elements of creativity gradually begin to penetrate more and more even into the most intimate "bowels" of modern production. The complexity of labor is increasing, the importance of human capital is increasing, creative elements are intensifying in the very content of labor and in general any economic activity, including entrepreneurship. Such activity requires not only impersonal, but also partly personal recognition.

At the same time, the elements of personal recognition are not limited to intra-company relations. They go beyond the boundaries of enterprises and penetrate the market, and not only the labor market, but also the product market. The creative potential of the company ultimately flows into its intellectual capital, which includes not only human capital, but also the so-called structural capital: patents, licenses, trademarks and trademarks, that is, everything that gives the company's product an individualized character and distinguishes it from products other firms. Thanks to this differentiation of products, the market of this firm is also "individualized". It is relatively isolated from the markets of other firms and from the industry market as a whole. Thus, product differentiation reinforces the monopolistic nature of competition.

Due to the relative isolation of its micromarket, a monopolistic competitor, unlike a perfect competitor, gains some power over price. The firm uses this power to keep the price of its products at a level above the average cost, and thereby earn economic profit. Such a gap between the price and costs of a monopolistic competitor

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means that its costs are recognized by society no longer simply as part of abstract, impersonal costs, do not dissolve in their "gray mass", but at least partly "individualize". The profit of such a monopolistic competitor acts as a quantitative measure of the elements of "individualized" recognition of the economic activities of the firm. Thus, creativity generates elements of personal recognition immanent to it in the sphere of economic activity of modern firms4.

But this is only one side of the development of the elements of individualized recognition. On the other hand, not only the object, but also the subject of public recognition can acquire an increasingly individualized character. The individualization of the subject means that the specific subject of social recognition is known even before the work began, aimed at satisfying his needs. In its pure form, this is typical for areas that work on individual orders, primarily for the service sector. But the point is not only in the increasing role of the service sector in the modern economy, and not only in the increasing spread of the practice of individual orders for material production, but also in a profound change in the very way of economic connection between production and consumption compared to classical impersonal production for an unknown market (16 , p.307; 17, p.9; 25, p.7).

We see, therefore, that the trend towards individualization permeates practically all aspects of the economic life of modern society. In all the most important spheres of economic activity, one way or another in contact with creativity, elements of the struggle for personal recognition inevitably make their way. However, these are only elements of that special way of recognition, which is immanent in the very nature of creative activity.

The origins of these trends modern development lie in the very structure of modern individual choice, in the contradictory composition of those alternative possibilities on which this choice is based, in the tendency to change this composition - to strengthen the significance of personal opportunities due to the relative decrease in the role of opportunities mediated by society. Of course, in any case, the initial, basic mass of opportunities is always taken from society in the finished A. Gorts emphasizes the constant desire of modern firms to give their products “an incomparable, immeasurable, unique value of works of art that have no equivalent and therefore are offered for sale at inflated prices”

Y. Kozak, A. Grimadyuk. The whole question is to what extent the subject adds to this set of possibilities mediated by society something of his own, personal, individual, or only the choice of these mediated social possibilities is individual. If he adds new opportunities created by himself, previously unknown to society and at the same time socially significant, that is, important for other subjects as possible options for their choice, then these new opportunities act as personal ones.

Just as primitive man did not wait until the primary, natural nature satisfies his needs, but began to create something objective to satisfy them, so does modern man living in a highly developed society, no matter how average, massively impersonal he is, is no longer inclined to choose only from the set of indirect social opportunities that society offers him. He is no longer only waiting for favors from society, but on an ever larger scale, more and more massively, he begins to create new opportunities for himself with his creativity, so that this gradually becomes the norm of life in a highly developed society, penetrating even into those most secret "bowels of production" , which have traditionally been the patrimony of a boring, stupefying man of labor.

Elements of creativity are becoming a social norm not only for the intellectual elite, but also for a wide range of ordinary representatives of the numerous "creative class".

conclusions

Thus, we come to the conclusion that the synthesis of the concept of alternative choice with the historical approach to the analysis of creative activity is methodologically quite possible. This leads to the conclusion that, thanks to such a synthesis, the methodological foundations of the analysis of creative activity in economic sociologists acquire a dual character. On the one hand, such an analysis proceeds from alternative possibilities of individual choice, which corresponds to the methodology of modern economic theory. This methodological basis for the analysis of creative activity makes it possible to establish an interdisciplinary connection between economic sociology and economic theory. Another methodological basis for the analysis of creative activity is the historical approach inherent in economic sociology to

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research. This approach allows us to consider the "creative class"

in a broad historical context, beginning in highly developed countries, the process of transforming the content of human activity in the direction of developing elements of creativity in it. The general methodological conclusion at the same time is that these elements of creativity and the “creative class” generated by them should be considered primarily from the point of view of the historical dynamics of modern society, taking into account both the current stage of its evolution and the prospects for further deployment of the process of creative transformation of the content of human activity. .

In the future, such a dynamic approach to the analysis of creative activity, as it develops, can lay the methodological foundations. further development the theory of the creative class.

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The article proposes an approach to the analysis of creative activity based on a combination of the concept of alternative possibilities of individual choice with an analysis of historical trends in the change in the content of human activity.