To fully appreciate the significance of the second German summer campaign in Russia, it is necessary to recall the goals of the first summer campaign. As we have seen, they consisted not in the conquest of all of Russia, but in making the Russian armies defend them by attacking the main strategic areas and lose defenders in subsequent battles. The strategic goal was tactical extermination.
We also saw that this strategy failed because the speed of advance was slow, the space was too large and the resistance was too strong.
If the strategy of destruction did not achieve its goal in the more favorable conditions of 1941, how could it have succeeded in the less favorable conditions of 1942? Hitler answered this question in the negative; and it would be foolish to resort to it again. Instead of a strategy of crushing, a strategy of attrition should be applied. However, there could be no question of solving this problem by tactical exhaustion; even if it were possible, such a course of action would take too long. There was no question of fanning the revolution against the Bolsheviks either. Consequently, there was only one possibility: to undermine the economic power of Russia, to strike at the material basis of its armed forces. It was decided that for this it was necessary to deprive Russia of the Donetsk industrial region, the Kuban granary and the Caucasian oil. In short, to deprive Russia of important strategic areas in the quadrangle of Kharkov, Stalingrad, Baku, Batumi, which would eventually put the Russian army out of action.

So, Hitler's plan for 1942, apparently, was as follows: to cut off and occupy the quadrangle of Voronezh, Saratov, Stalingrad, Rostov by an offensive in two parallel directions: in the north along the Kursk, Saratov line and in the south along the Taganrog, Stalingrad line. Under the cover of this blockade, pass through the Caucasus to Baku.
According to two historians, the existence of such a plan "is confirmed by a document that fell into the hands of the Russians and was mentioned by Prime Minister Stalin in his speech on the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution." The document outlined the order of the occupation of the following cities: Borisoglebsk, eastern Voronezh - by July 10, Stalingrad - by July 25, Saratov - by August 10, Syzran - by August 15, Arzamas, south of Gorky - by September 10.
The very speed of the planned occupation of cities is surprising, but even more surprising is what should be clear even to a beginner in strategy: the success of the campaign depended not so much on taking important points as on how much it was possible to prevent retaliation from the Russians. As can be seen from the plan, the Russian armies located north of the Voronezh-Saratov line were ignored. Given the space of Russia and the strength of the Russian armies, it was obvious that they could not be exterminated tactically, just as it was impossible to crush the Russian people due to their high moral fortitude. Consequently, success could be achieved only if they were strategically paralyzed, but not by depriving the resources that would be needed in the future, such as oil, coal and wheat, to deprive the Russians of their ability to move. Therefore, first of all it is necessary to occupy or besiege Moscow. As Paris is the central junction of the French railways, so Moscow is the central junction of the Russian railways. In 1914, because the Germans did not occupy Paris, there was a disaster on the Marne. In 1942, as we will see below, the failure near Moscow led to a catastrophe on the Volga. If Moscow were in the hands of the Germans, then the constant strategic bombing of Vologda, Buy, Gorky, Arzamas and Penza, located at a distance of 250 - 350 miles from Moscow and, therefore, easily accessible for bombers, would have succeeded not only in stopping the supply of supplies from Arkhangelsk and reserves from the Asian part of Russia, but also lead to a chaotic state of traffic on the railways in the central part of Russia, and maybe stop all traffic.

The armies that were to carry out Hitler's plan were commanded by Field Marshal von Bock. The morale and training of the armies was lower than in 1941, but the firepower increased. The bulky tank division of 400 tanks was reduced to 250 tanks of improved models, the air force was organized into shock groups, which interacted more closely with ground forces than before. The Germans adopted new tank tactics, the creation of which is credited to Field Marshal Rommel. It was called “motpulk” and was essentially a modernized copy of the Hussite mobile camp. Colonel de Waterville describes it as follows:
“The mass of mobile equipment was located in such a way that tanks and self-propelled artillery were the outer contour, inside which was located a vulnerable center: infantry in vehicles, anti-tank artillery, mobile repair shops and all the modern equipment needed by the army in battle ... First of all, it was combat an organism with enormous firepower, extremely mobile and covered with thick armor ... "
The main German offensive began only on June 28, but it was preceded by important battles. On May 8, Field Marshal von Manstein, who commanded the German 12th Army in the Crimea, launched an offensive on Kerch and took the city by storm on May 13. As this battle drew to a close, on May 12, Marshal Timoshenko, in order to delay the advance of the Germans, struck a strong blow south of Kharkov. Rapidly advancing from Lozovaya in the direction of Kharkov and Poltava, Russian troops occupied Krasnograd on May 16 and broke through the outer defense belt of the "superhezh" (Kharkov) and two days later began fighting on the outskirts of the city. On May 19, the Germans launched a counteroffensive in large forces. After heavy fighting in the Barvenkovo \u200b\u200barea, Izium, Marshal Timoshenko was forced to leave Krasnograd. During the retreat, a significant part of his troops were surrounded and taken prisoner. On June 1, the Germans declared complete victory, but for them this offensive was an unpleasant event.
Four days later, von Manstein began bombing Sevastopol, preparing to storm the fortress. The outer defensive belt of the fortress was 20 miles long, the inner one 8 miles long. The fortress was defended by a garrison of 75 thousand people under the command of General Petrov. On July 1, after a fierce battle, during which 50 thousand tons of artillery shells were fired at the fortress and 25 thousand tons of bombs were dropped, Sevastopol was taken by storm. Thus, the entire Crimea was in the hands of the Germans.
By mid-June, the concentration of German troops on the winter front line west of the Oskol River left the Russians no doubt about the impending powerful offensive. Here von Bock brought up the following forces: in the Kursk area - the 2nd Army, the 2nd Panzer Army and the Hungarian army, all under the command of General von Weich; to the Belgorod region - the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army under the command of General von Goth; the 17th Army and the 1st Tank Army under the command of Field Marshal von Kleist to the Kharkov region; the Italian army remained in reserve west of Kharkov. To the south of this army group was General Schwedler's group, which was to be placed at the disposal of Field Marshal von Manstein's 12th Army; the latter, together with the Romanian army, was transferred from Crimea in the near future.
The Russians assumed that the German offensive would begin on the Voronezh, Rostov front and would develop along the Saratov, Stalingrad line, so they concentrated a strong grouping north of Voronezh and well fortified the Voronezh and Rostov areas, as well as the Donets River line.
On June 22, the Germans suddenly struck from the Izyum area and three days later drove the Russians out of Kupyansk. Then, on June 28, the long-awaited offensive followed, which began with a strike east of Kursk. On July 1, the Russian front between Shchigry and Tim was broken through. On July 2, the Germans launched an offensive between Belgorod and Kharkov in large forces. The Russian front was broken through again, and by July 5 the Germans reached the western outskirts of Voronezh in the north and the Svatovo and Lisichansk lines in the south.
The battle for Voronezh began, and, as we will see, for the Germans it was one of the most fatal during the entire war.
On July 6 and 7, von Weich's tanks and motorized infantry crossed the Don and broke into Voronezh, which is located in the corner formed by the Don and a small tributary, so that the city is surrounded on three sides by a water barrier. The German infantry, which entered the battle, was attacked from the flank between the rivers. "The Russian troops, concentrated ... north of Voronezh, arrived in time to save the day, perhaps they saved the Russians the entire campaign." .
There is no doubt that this was the case. Over the next ten days, while there were fierce battles in the city, the offensive south of Voronezh developed at great speed. Comparing it with the resistance of the Russians in Voronezh itself produced a strange psychological effect on Hitler.
By July 12, von Goth took Rossosh and Kantemirovka, stations on the Voronezh-Rostov railway, the next day, von Kleist's 1st Panzer Army occupied Millerovo. Voroshilovgrad was outflanked and occupied on 20 July. Meanwhile, von Manstein's armies were moving to Rostov, which the Russians evacuated on 27 July.
“The entire Russian front was falling apart ... the German army crossed the Don on a wide front. The tone of the Russian communiqués became serious, there was growing concern in radio broadcasts ... There were insistent demands in Russia to open a second front ”
The rapid advance towards Stalingrad and the unexpected Russian resistance in Voronezh seem to have prompted Hitler to leave a barrier in Voronezh from von Weichs's army group, and to send von Goth's group straight east to work with von Manstein against Stalingrad. Only after the fall of Stalingrad was the offensive against Saratov supposed to resume.
From a strategic point of view, this mistake borders on insanity. Since no attempt was made to disable the Moscow railway junction, the Russian armies north of Voronezh had complete freedom of movement. The occupation of the Caucasus was the main goal of the German plan. This could only be done in this way: to create a deep defensive area north of the Caucasus, that is, as provided by the original plan, to occupy the quadrangle of Rostov, Stalingrad, Saratov, Voronezh, which was caused by the need to ensure the depth of defense and space for maneuvering. Having occupied not a quadrangle, but a triangle Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, the Germans formed a wedge. The northern side of the wedge - the Voronezh, Stalingrad line - was opened for the Russian offensive in the southern direction from the Voronezh, Saratov line. The change in the line of operation thus prepared the final defeat.
In accordance with the changed plan, von Weichs's armies dug in at Voronezh. Hungarian, Italian and Romanian divisions were used to defend von Hoth's strategic flank along the western bank of the Don. Meanwhile, von Manstein's group, advancing from Rostov, crossed the Don in the lower reaches of Tsimlyanskaya, while von Kleist rushed south, to the plains of the North Caucasus.
During the last week of July and the first week of August, von Hoth's troops quickly descended downstream of the Don, and a fierce struggle broke out for bridgeheads at Kletskaya and Kalach, where the Don, west of Stalingrad, turns south. On August 15, the crossing at Kalach was captured, but only on August 25 the river at Kletskaya was forced. German troops advancing south of the Don were stopped at Kotelnikovo. Only after crossing the river by the troops of General von Goth were they able to continue the offensive. On September 9, the Stalingrad-Borisoglebsk railway was cut, and Stalingrad was heavily bombed from the air. It seemed to the Germans that the city would soon fall.
While operations were unfolding in this way, von Kleist's group, crossing the lower Don, quickly spread over the steppes of the North Caucasus. On August 4, Voroshilovsk fell, on August 8 the Russians destroyed and abandoned the Maikop oil fields, on August 20 Krasnodar was occupied, on August 25 German troops reached Mozdok in the middle reaches of the Terek, 100 miles from the Caspian Sea; the Russians were retreating to Grozny. Finally, on September 10, the naval base on the Black Sea - Novorossiysk - fell. Because of the difficult terrain, the resistance of the Russians, the stretched communications and the lack of fuel, the Caucasian campaign actually ended there. Everything was thrown into the capture of Stalingrad. Stalingrad (formerly Tsaritsyn) was a large, widely sprawled industrial city with a population of about 500,000; it stands on the right bank of the Volga, several miles above its bend. The German advance on the city was made difficult by the fact that the Volga here is 2 - 2.5 miles wide and, therefore, difficult to cross. The city could not be completely surrounded without crossing the river.
The Germans faced the problem of gaining a foothold on the left bank of the Volga. Then a relatively small army could stop all movement along the river and force the garrison of Stalingrad to leave the city with a blockade.
For any crossing of a river with a battle, the determining factor is not at all the width of the river, although this is important, but the width of the advance front. If the front is wide, the attackers will distract the enemy's attention by false attempts to cross in several places, build a bridge on some undefended or weakly defended sector of the enemy's defense and create a bridgehead. A wide river, such as the Volga, takes more time to cross than a narrow one, therefore, the front for diversion operations must be wider. The Germans first of all had to create such a front. However, they did not do this, but resorted to a direct strike, trying to take the city by bombing and storming.

The assault began on 15 September. For a whole month, attack followed attack, but the garrison under the command of General Chuikov offered strong resistance, and the Germans were able to achieve only local, or temporary, successes. The extreme idiocy of such a course of action should have become apparent as soon as it became clear that the city could not be taken on the move. The city is not a fortress, but as long as the garrison holds its ground and its supply lines are operational, turning the city into a heap of ruins is nothing more than the easiest way to create an obstacle that is stronger than any of the specially built fortresses.
The losses of the German troops in the senseless assaults were so heavy that on October 15, General Goth was ordered to stop the attacks and systematic artillery fire and aerial bombardment to wipe Stalingrad off the face of the earth. What for? There is only one possible answer: to support Hitler's prestige, for the city was already in ruins. The industry of Stalingrad was destroyed, the Volga was intercepted, the movement of transports along the Volga up and down was suspended. The delivery of oil from Baku to Moscow has stopped. Consequently, now it only remained to keep the river blocked, the city itself was tactically of no value.
Thus, the Germans let go of the initiative for the offensive in Russia, and at the same time they were increasingly losing it in North Africa. Many factors create and support the initiative, but the main factor is ensuring freedom of movement for oneself or, on the contrary, limiting this freedom for the enemy. Both in North Africa and in Stalingrad, essentially throughout Russia, there was one common, all-determining factor - the excessive length of German communications plus the difficulties associated with their protection.
Rommel's communications from Egypt extended 1,200 miles to Tripoli and another 1,300 miles in a straight line to the industrial cities of Germany that supplied his armies. The length of Gotha's communications through Russia was 1000 miles and through Germany to the central regions - 600 miles. In the first case, as long as the British held Malta firmly, they could operate against the lines of communication of Rommel's army; in the second case, while the Russians held Moscow, they had freedom of maneuver against von Goth's troops, while Russian partisan units forced the Germans to defend every mile of their communications and, therefore, distracted hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the front.
Nevertheless, in the fall of 1942, the economic situation in Russia was desperate, and, if not for the constant influx of Anglo-American materials through Arkhangelsk, it is doubtful that the Russians could take advantage of the ridiculous position in which Hitler had placed his armies.
On June 6, 1941, as a result of the German occupation, the population under the rule of the Soviet government decreased from 184 million to 126 million, that is, by more than 30%. Russia suffered huge economic losses. Was lost: food resources - 38%, coal and electricity - 50%, iron and steel - 60%, manganese and aluminum - 50%, the chemical industry - 33%.
Consequently, the main idea of \u200b\u200bHitler's strategic plan was correct: to strike at the Russian economy, the basis of its military power. In the implementation of the plan, mistake after mistake was made. The size of Russia did not make it possible to force the enemy to a general battle; Hitler did not understand that first it was necessary to deprive the enemy of mobility and only then to occupy important strategic areas. Russians could be immobilized by occupying the center of Russian communications - Moscow. Instead, Hitler, like Charles XII and more than Napoleon, lost the initiative.
After the great victory at Poltava in 1709, Peter the Great entered Kiev. A prayer service was served in the Hagia Sophia. Russian priest Feofan Prokopovich, addressing the tsar and his soldiers, said: "Our neighbors and neighbors will recognize and say: as if not into our land, but into a certain sea the Svei forces have risen, plunged like tin into the water and the messenger from them will not return to his homeland" .
This is the secret of Russian power, which Hitler did not take into account in his strategy. It could be undermined only by depriving the Russian armies of mobility, then the space of Russia would turn for them from an ally into a mortal enemy.

The source of information:
Book: World War II. 1939-1945. Strategic and tactical overview

MAIN BATTLES Winter campaign of 1942-1943 Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943) Summer-autumn campaign of 1943 Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943) The Battle of the Dnieper is a series of interconnected strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War, carried out during the second half of 1943 on the banks of the Dnieper.

The Battle of Stalingrad By the middle of the summer of 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War reached the Volga. The German command also includes Stalingrad in the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea). Germany's goal was to seize an industrial city, enterprises in which produced military products that were needed; gaining access to the Volga, from where it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil necessary for the front was extracted. Hitler wanted to implement this plan in just a week with the help of Paulus's 6th Field Army. It consisted of 13 divisions, where there were about 270,000 people. , 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks. On the part of the USSR, the forces of Germany were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov). The difficulty was also that our side was experiencing a lack of ammunition.

The beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad can be considered on July 17, when the advance detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with the detachments of the 6th German army near the Chir and Tsimla rivers. Throughout the second half of the summer, there were fierce battles near Stalingrad. Further, the chronicle of events developed as follows. On August 23, 1942, German tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, the fascist aviation began to systematically bomb the city. On the ground, battles did not die down either. It was simply impossible to live in the city - you had to fight to win. 75 thousand people volunteered for the front. But in the city itself, people worked day and night. By mid-September, the German army had broken through to the city center, fighting in the streets. The fascists intensified the attack more and more. Almost 500 tanks took part in the storming of Stalingrad, and German aviation dropped about 1 million bombs on the city. The courage of the Stalingrad people was unmatched. Many European countries were conquered by the Germans. Sometimes they only needed 2-3 weeks to take over the whole country. In Stalingrad, the situation was different. It took the Nazis weeks to capture one house, one street.

The beginning of autumn, mid-November passed in the battles. By November, almost the entire city, despite resistance, was captured by the Germans. Only a small strip of land on the banks of the Volga was still held by our troops. But it was too early to declare the capture of Stalingrad, as Hitler did. The Germans did not know that the Soviet command already had a plan for the defeat of the German troops, which began to be developed at the height of the fighting, on September 12. Marshal GK Zhukov was involved in the development of the offensive operation "Uranus". Within 2 months, under conditions of increased secrecy, a strike group was created near Stalingrad. The Nazis realized the weakness of their flanks, but did not assume that the Soviet command would be able to collect the required number of troops.

Further, the history of the Battle of Stalingrad was as follows: on November 19, the troops of the South-Western Front under the command of General N.F. Vatutin and the Don Front under the command of General K.K.Rokossovsky went on the offensive. They managed to surround the enemy, despite the resistance. Also, during the offensive, five enemy divisions were captured and seven enemy divisions were defeated. During the week of November 23rd, the efforts of the Soviet troops were aimed at strengthening the blockade around the enemy. In order to lift this blockade, the German command formed Army Group Don (commanded by Field Marshal Manstein), but it was also defeated. The destruction of the encircled grouping of the enemy army was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commanded by General K. K. Rokossovsky). Since the German command rejected the ultimatum to end resistance, the Soviet troops proceeded to destroy the enemy, which was the last of the main stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. February 1943, the last enemy group was eliminated, which is considered the date of the end of the battle. 2

Results of the Battle of Stalingrad: Losses in the Battle of Stalingrad on each side amounted to about 2 million people. The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad can hardly be overestimated. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad had a great influence on the further course of the Second World War. She stepped up the fight against the Nazis in all European countries. As a result of this victory, the German side ceased to dominate. The outcome of this battle caused confusion in the Axis (Hitlerite coalition) countries. There was a crisis of pro-fascist regimes in European countries.

Kursk Bulge In the spring of 1943, a relative calm was established on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased the production of military equipment at the expense of the resources of all of Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. A lot of work was done to strengthen the Soviet army. Design bureaus have improved and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, a large number of tank and mechanized corps were formed. Aviation equipment was improved, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing is after the Stalingrad

Stalin and the Headquarters initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. However, Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky were able to predict the place and time of the future offensive of the Wehrmacht. The Germans, who had lost their strategic initiative, were unable to carry out large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having gathered together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the ledge of the front line, which had formed in the Kursk region. By winning this operation, Hitler planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor. Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the place of concentration of troops and their number. The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2,000 tanks, 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.

Zhukov suggested not to preempt the enemy's attack with his own offensive, but, having organized a defense in depth, meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3600 tanks and 2400 aircraft were concentrated. Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank strike in the entire war on the Red Army formations. Methodically breaking into the defenses, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10 -35 km in the first days of the fighting. At some moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment the blow was struck by fresh units of the Steppe Front.

The Battle of Prokhorovka became the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation that went down in history as the Battle of Kursk, which was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The events of those days unfolded as follows. The Hitlerite command planned to conduct a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in their favor. For this, a military operation codenamed "Citadel" was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the German fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go over to the defensive on the Kursk salient and in the course of a defensive battle to bleed the enemy strike forces. Thus, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.

On July 12, 1943, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Prokhorovka railway station (56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing tank grouping of the Germans (4th Panzer Army, Operational Group Kempf) was stopped by a counterstrike of Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army). Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the operational line Yakovlevo - Oboyan. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops in the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went over to the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, at the positions of the 6th and 7th Guards armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the side of the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (north) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the forces of the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

To provide assistance to the 1st Tank Army of Katukov, which is conducting heavy battles in the Oboyansk direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterstrike. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed a directive number 0014 / op on readiness for the transition to active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack launched by the forces of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the brigades of the 1st TA, did not bring tangible results. Not having achieved a decisive success - by this time, the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the edge of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention to reach Kursk through the bend of the Psel River ...

The change in the direction of the strike was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most expedient to meet the inevitable counterattack of the outnumbered Soviet tank reserves. If, before the approach of Soviet tank reserves, the village of Prokhorovka will not be occupied by German troops, it was supposed to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to use the terrain that is advantageous for themselves, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from breaking out of the narrow defile formed by the muddy floodplain the Psel River and a railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantages by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

By July 11, the Germans had taken up their initial positions for the capture of Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence information about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable Soviet counterstrike. The 1st SS Leibstandarte Division "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than the other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took the defile and on July 11 did not undertake any attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, bringing up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf", which provided its flanks, fought active offensive battles outside the defile on 11 July, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf, covering the left flank. "Expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River and managed to ferry a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of their attack through the defile).

By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defensive positions on the Prokhorovka-Vesyoly line. The concentration area of \u200b\u200bthe 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorov area.

On the other hand, the choice of this area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy grouping (2 m SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defending this direction of the 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler". The front-line counterattack on 12 July was planned to be delivered by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards) were able to go on the attack, the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. The 1st SS Leibstandarte Division Adolf Hitler, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" were facing the front of the Soviet offensive.

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o'clock, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during a reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades. At 8 am the Soviet side carried out an artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, the Soviet tankers gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of combat, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles. To the south of the main battle, the German tank group "Kempf" was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping into the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction. At about 13 o'clock the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the "Dead's Head" division, struck at the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed. By 14 o'clock the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy in the western direction. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

The battle for the Dnieper by Soviet troops in Ukraine in August - December 1943 was carried out with the aim of liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine, Northern Tavria, Donbass and Kiev, as well as creating strong bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper. After the defeat at Kursk, the German command developed a Wotan defense plan. It envisaged the creation of a well-fortified Eastern Rampart from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which ran along the Narva-Pskov-Gomel line and further along the Dnieper.

This line was supposed, according to the plan of the German leadership, to stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west. The main core of the defenders of the Dnieper part of the "Eastern Wall" in the Ukraine were units of the Army Group "South" (Field Marshal E. Manstein). The troops of the Central (General K.K.Rokossovsky), Voronezh (General N.F. Vatutin), Stepnoy (General I.S.Konev), Southwestern (General R. Ya. I. Tolbukhin) fronts. The balance of forces at the beginning of the battle for the Dnieper is shown in the table. Soviet troops German troops Personnel, thousand 2633 1240 Guns and mortars 51200 12600 Tanks 2400 2100 Aircraft 2850 2000

The battle for the Dnieper consisted of two stages. At the first stage (in August - September), units of the Red Army liberated Donbass, the Left-Bank Ukraine, crossed the Dnieper on the move and captured a number of bridgeheads on its right bank. The battle for the Dnieper began on August 26 with the Chernigov - Poltava operation (August 26 - September 30), in which the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts participated. It took place simultaneously with the Donbas operation. The troops of the Central Front were the first to go over to the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 60th Army (General ID Chernyakhovsky), which managed to break through the non-German defenses in a secondary sector, south of Sevsk. The front commander, General Rokossovsky, promptly reacted to this success and, regrouping his forces, threw the main shock units of the front into the breakthrough. This decision turned out to be a major strategic win. Already on August 31, the troops of the Central Front managed to expand the Breakthrough in width up to 100 km and in depth up to 60 km, having pulled out the Germans and began to withdraw troops to the Desna and Dnieper. Meanwhile, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts joined the offensive.

In early September, the Red Army's offensive unfolded across the entire Left Bank Ukraine, which completely deprived the German command of the ability to maneuver reserves. Under these conditions, it began to withdraw its troops across the Dnieper. In pursuit of the retreating units, the advanced units of the Red Army advanced towards the Dnieper on a 750-kilometer stretch from Loev to Zaporizhzhya and immediately began crossing this water barrier. By the end of September, on this strip, Soviet troops captured 20 bridgeheads on the right bank. The calculations of the German leadership for a long-term defense of the Left Bank were thwarted. In October - December, the second stage of the battle began, when a fierce struggle was waged to expand and hold the bridgeheads. At the same time, there was a tightening of reserves, building bridges and building up forces for a new strike. During this period, the troops operating in the Ukraine became part of the four Ukrainian fronts formed on October 20. At this stage, the Red Army carried out two strategic operations: Nizhnedneprovskaya and Kievskaya.

The Lower Dnieper operation (September 26 - December 20) was carried out by the troops of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian), Southwestern (3rd Ukrainian) and Southern (4th Ukrainian) fronts. In the course of the operation, they liberated Northern Tavria, blockaded the Crimean peninsula and seized the largest bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper from Cherkassy to Zaporozhye (450 km in length and up to 100 km in depth). However, their attempts to break through from this bridgehead into the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were stopped by mid-December by fierce resistance from German units, which received reinforcements from the West and other regions of Ukraine. The Nizhnedneprovsk operation was distinguished by large losses of the Red Army, which amounted to 754 thousand people. (about half of all losses of Soviet troops in the battles for Ukraine from August to December 1943).

The Kiev operation (October 12 - December 23) of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front was also difficult. It began with the battles north and south of Kiev for the Lyutezhsky and Bukrinsky bridgeheads. Initially, the Soviet command planned to attack Kiev from the south, from the Bukrin area. However, the rugged terrain prevented the offensive of the troops, especially the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P.S. Rybalko. Then this army was secretly transferred to the Lyutezh bridgehead, from where it was decided to deliver the main blow. On November 3, 1943, Soviet troops launched an offensive north of Kiev, which was liberated on November 6. The Germans failed to gain a foothold on the Dnieper line. Their front was broken through, and Soviet mobile units liberated Zhitomir on November 13. Despite the German counterattack in this area, Manstein failed to recapture Kiev (see Kiev operation).

By the end of 1943, the battle for the Dnieper was over. By that time, the Eastern Rampart in Ukraine had been broken through almost its entire length. Soviet troops captured two large strategic bridgeheads (from Kiev to Pripyat and from Cherkassy to Zaporozhye) and dozens of operational tactical bridgeheads. The hopes of the Wehrmacht command to give their troops the opportunity to rest and regroup forces on the "winter line" under the protection of a large water barrier turned out to be unrealizable. The battle for the Dnieper became a rare example in the history of wars of such a large-scale and rapid crossing of such a wide water barrier with fierce resistance from large enemy forces. In the opinion of the German general von Butlar, during this offensive "the Russian army demonstrated its high combat qualities and showed that it has not only significant human resources, but also excellent military equipment." The importance attached by the Soviet leadership to the breakthrough of the "Eastern Wall" is evidenced by the fact that 2,438 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper (20% of the total number of those awarded this title for the war). The losses of Soviet troops during the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine with Kiev, Donbass, Northern Tavria, as well as the struggle on the bridgeheads exceeded 1.5 million people. (including irrevocable - 373 thousand people), about 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (without the Kiev defensive operation), about 1, 2 thousand aircraft (without the Kiev defensive operation).

The General Staff headed by B.M. Shaposhnikov proposed to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command for the summer campaign of 1942 a plan of deep defense, since the main combat units of the Red Army were around Moscow in the stage of reorganization and replenishment. In addition, in the spring of 1942 near Leningrad, near the village of Lyuban, the 2nd Soviet Shock Army was defeated, and its commander, Lieutenant General A. Vlasov, surrendered. However, I. Stalin, despite these unfavorable conditions, insisted on carrying out large-scale offensive operations of the Red Army. In April 1942 in the Crimea in the Kerch region as a result of inept actions by the front commander D.T. Kozlov and a member of the Military Council of the Front L.Z. Mehlis, the offensive of our troops ended in defeat: the total losses amounted to about 200 thousand people. On July 4, they had to leave Sevastopol, which had heroically defended for 8 months.

In May 1942, near Kharkov, the troops of the Southwestern Front (S.K. Timoshenko and NS Khrushchev) went on the offensive without preliminary preparation and in the absence of reserves, but were surrounded by enemy troops and lost 18-20 divisions. The initiative in hostilities passed to the German troops. In June 1942, they occupied the Donbass and Rostov-on-Don, broke through the front of the Red Army in the bend of the Don and continued to advance on Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. There were no defensive structures on the approaches to Stalingrad, so German tank columns soon appeared on the outskirts of the city, and in the North Caucasus they reached the Main Caucasian ridge.

On July 28, 1942, I. Stalin issued order No. 227 "Not one step back!", Which introduced severe punishments for commanders and commissars who allowed their units to retreat without orders from their commanders: they were declared enemies of the Motherland and brought to trial by a military tribunal. In addition, penal companies were formed, where ordinary soldiers and junior commanders were sent, "guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability ...". In the rear of some divisions, they began to deploy armed barrage detachments and ordered them "in the event of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units, to shoot panic-mongers and cowards on the spot." The detachments were canceled only on November 13, 1944, but the punitive counterintelligence body “SMERSH” (“death to spies”) with unlimited powers continued to operate.

At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the fascist command transferred an additional 80 divisions and a lot of military equipment to the Eastern Front in order to cut off the Volga region and the Caucasus from the center of Russia and take Moscow in a roundabout way. The Hitlerite troops included Austrian, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian units, and Finnish troops blocked Leningrad from the north.

On July 17, 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad began, which lasted 200 days until February 2, 1943; direct battles on the streets of Stalingrad unfolded on September 12, 1942. The 62nd Army of V.I. Chuikov, 64th Army of M.S. Shumilov and the 13th youth rifle division of A.I. Rodimtsev, almost the entire composition of which died in stubborn battles for every house.

The general leadership of our troops on the Volga was headed by representatives of the Headquarters, Marshals G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky and N.N. Voronov. According to the Uranus plan, on November 19, 1942, the Red Army went over to the offensive with the forces of three fronts: South-West (N.F. Vatutin), Donskoy (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingradsky (A.I. Eremenko). On November 23, 1942, the 330,000-strong group of fascists was surrounded, but did not capitulate, hoping for outside help. On December 24, 1942, the tank corps of General V.M. Bogdanov, behind enemy lines, defeated the airfield near the village of Tatsinskaya, from where the grouping of Field Marshal F. Paulus was supplied by air. Tankers destroyed 430 Nazi aircraft.

On January 10, 1943, following the "Ring" plan, the Red Army began routing the encircled enemy grouping in Stalingrad. The attempts of Manstein's army group to unblock the encircled Nazis from the west ended in failure, and the enemy troops were driven back to the west by 170-250 km. Successfully advancing in the direction of Rostov-on-Don, the Red Army cut off the fascist troops operating in the North Caucasus, and they rolled back to the Crimea.

During the period of the fighting on the Volga, the enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured, lost 3.5 thousand tanks, 12 thousand guns, 75 thousand vehicles and 3 thousand aircraft. In Stalingrad alone, 91 thousand fascists were taken prisoner, including 2,500 officers and 24 generals headed by Field Marshal F. Paulus. Hitler declared 3 days of mourning throughout Germany. The military power and prestige of Germany were undermined, the initiative in hostilities passed to the Red Army, and a radical change began in the course of the Great Patriotic War in favor of the USSR.

After the defeat of the fascist troops on the Volga, the Red Army launched a general strategic offensive, which lasted until the end of March 1943. During this time, the enemy troops were driven back 600-700 km. This made it possible for the troops of the Leningrad (L.A. Govorov) and Volkhovsky (K.A. Meretskov) fronts to break through the blockade of Leningrad in January 1943.

The success of the Red Army was largely determined by the valor of the home front workers, who in 1942 produced 25.4 thousand aircraft, 24.5 thousand tanks, 33.1 thousand guns, while Germany produced only 14 thousand aircraft during this time, 6 , 1 thousand tanks, 14 thousand guns, and almost all of the Europe conquered by it worked for fascist Germany.

thesis

1.1 The plans of the Hitlerite military command

On the eve of the second year of the Great Patriotic War, the situation in the Soviet Union remained difficult. His material and human losses were enormous, the territories seized by the enemy were vast. However, the strategy of "lightning-fast" war of Nazi Germany against the USSR failed. In a grandiose armed confrontation on the outskirts of Moscow, the troops of the Red Army defeated the main group of the Wehrmacht and threw it back from the Soviet capital. The Battle of Moscow had not yet finally decided the outcome of the struggle in favor of the USSR, but it marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Patriotic and Second World Wars.

According to the plans of the German command, the forty-second year was supposed to be a decisive year in the war, because Hitler was sure that the United States and England would not undertake a landing of their troops in Europe this year, he still had his hands untied for operations in the east.

However, the defeat near Moscow, the losses of the summer of 1941, inflicted by the Red Army on the invaders, could not but affect. Despite the fact that by the spring of 1942 the Hitlerite army had grown in numbers and received significant technical equipment, the German command did not find the strength to attack along the entire front.

"At the end of 1941, the Nazi army was under arms 9500 thousand, and in 1942 already 10204 thousand" VP Morozov Historical feat of Stalingrad. - M., 1982. - S. 41 ... The overall strength of the army increased, and the chief of the Hitlerite General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Halder, entered in his diary the following significant entry: “As of May 1, 1942, 318,000 men are missing in the East. It was proposed to send 240 thousand people to the army in the East in May. For the period from May to September there is a reserve of 960 thousand young recruits. Then, in September, there will be nothing else. ”Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: a war diary. - Smolensk, 2001 .-- S. 231..

A little later, at the headquarters of the OKW operational leadership, a more accurate document was drawn up regarding the general state of the Hitlerite army. The certificate intended for Hitler said: "The combat capability of the armed forces is generally lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the impossibility of fully providing them with people and material resources."

“And yet, by the summer of 1942,” writes General Chuikov, “Hitler was able to concentrate quite significant forces against us. On the Soviet-German front, he had an army of six million, numbering up to 43 thousand guns and mortars, over three thousand tanks, and up to three and a half thousand combat aircraft. The forces are significant. Hitler started the war with lesser ones "Chuikov V.I. Battle of the century. - M., 1985 .-- S. 211..

Hitler undertook a campaign to the Caucasus with the aim of seizing oil sources, access to the Iranian border, to the Volga. He apparently hoped that at a distance from the center of the country the resistance of the Soviet troops would not be so solid.

By entering the Caucasus, Hitler hoped to involve Turkey in the war, which would give him another twenty to thirty divisions. By reaching the Volga and the Iranian border, he hoped to involve Japan in the war against the Soviet Union. Turkey's and Japan's performance was his last chance of success in the war against us. Only this can explain such a broad-based nature of his directive for the spring-summer campaign in 1942.

Let us turn to the text of this directive, known as directive number 41. The introduction already contains not an analysis of the current situation on the Soviet-German front, but propaganda idle talk.

The directive begins with these words: “The winter campaign in Russia is drawing to a close. Thanks to the outstanding courage and readiness of the soldiers of the Eastern Front for self-sacrifice, our defensive actions were crowned with great success of German weapons. The enemy suffered huge losses in men and equipment. Seeking to exploit the perceived initial success, he used up most of the reserves for further operations this winter. ”

"The goal is," says the directive, "to finally destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers."

"... First of all, all the forces at our disposal should be concentrated for the main operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge."

And then a reservation follows. "The final encirclement of Leningrad and the seizure of Ingermanland are postponed until a change in the situation in the encirclement area or the release of other forces sufficient for this create appropriate opportunities."

This reservation shows that Hitler, having forces greater than those with which he began his campaign in Russia, did not dare to carry out operations along the entire front, but concentrated everything in the south.

As General Chuikov wrote: “The directive is a document of a secret nature, a document with which a limited circle of persons had the right to familiarize themselves, it is a document in which there is no place for propaganda wording. He must accurately and soberly assess the situation. We see that, in its premise, the German command completely misjudges our forces, and is trying to portray its defeat near Moscow as a military success. Underestimating our strengths, Hitler at the same time overestimates his own "Chuikov V.I. Battle of the century. - S. 234.

Thus, the main goal of the enemy offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above directive No. 41, was to win a victory over the Soviet Union. “However, unlike the Barbarossa plan,” writes A.M. Samsonov, - the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the "blitzkrieg" strategy. That is why Directive # 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, to defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, to seize the southern regions of the USSR rich in strategic raw materials "Samsonov A.M. Battle of Stalingrad. - M., 1989 .-- S. 327. To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a number of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov and after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions. The operation to seize Leningrad and establish ground communication with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task in the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period had to improve its operational position through private operations.

Hitler declared on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 "the Russian army will be completely destroyed" Welz G. Soldiers who were betrayed. - Smolensk, 1999 .-- S. 69. It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the real strategy. But here it was more likely something else.

The essentially adventurous Hitler policy could not be based on deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations for 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack, and even whether to attack at all on the Eastern Front, became more and more difficult for Hitler's generals.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive on the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy's plan, the successful conduct of, first of all, the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. In this strategic plan of the enemy, the acute need of Nazi Germany for fuel was very strongly reflected.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the command staff of Army Group South in the Poltava area, Hitler said that "if he does not receive oil from Maikop and Grozny, he will have to end this war" Nuremberg Trials / Ed. Batova P.I. - M., 1994 .-- S. 178. At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the USSR's loss of oil would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. “It was a delicate calculation that was closer to its goal than it is generally believed after its final catastrophic failure.” Liddell Garth BG Indirect Action Strategy. - M., 1997 .-- S. 347-348. ...

So, the German military command no longer had confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Yet the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. “The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops begin hostilities on the continent of Europe. The Nazis had no doubts that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened. ”Dashichev V. I. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. T. 2: Aggression against the USSR. Fall of the "third empire". - M., 1983 .-- S. 125. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR were outlined for some in a completely different way than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity in this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the German high command faced the question of how to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of the chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and in the West. 1942 was the last year in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to decide what should be done on a 3,000-kilometer front to ensure the success of the offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that on most of the front, the troops had to go on the defensive. " Stalingrad: lessons of history / Ed. Chuikova V.I. - M., 1980 .-- S. 134.

The specific content of the plan for the 1942 summer campaign at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among the Hitlerite generals. “The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Kühler, proposed initially to carry out an offensive in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front with the aim of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also stood for the renewal of the offensive, but, as before, continued to regard the central direction as decisive and recommended that the main attack on Moscow be carried out with the forces of Army Group Center "Butlar von. War in Russia / World War 1939-1945 - M., 1957.- S. 92. Halder believed that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl, ordered the main efforts of the German troops in the summer of 1942 to be sent south to capture the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, the operation to capture Leningrad was planned to be postponed until the moment when the troops in the south were freed.

The fascist German main command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, hoping to defeat Soviet troops here in successive operations in parts. Thus, although when planning the 1942 campaign, Hitler's strategists first began to show hesitation, nevertheless, as before, the highest military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a single point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited number of people from the higher headquarters were invited.

According to the plan of the Hitlerite military-political leadership, the Nazi troops in the summer campaign of 1942 still had to achieve the military and political goals set by the Barbarossa plan, which in 1941 were not achieved due to the defeat near Moscow. The main blow was supposed to be inflicted on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in order to capture the city of Stalingrad, access the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and the fertile regions of the Don, Kuban and the Lower Volga, disrupt communications linking the center of the country with the Caucasus, and create conditions for the end of the war in our favor (see Appendix 1). Hitler's strategists believed that the loss of Donbass and Caucasian oil would seriously weaken the Soviet Union, and that the withdrawal of fascist German troops into the Transcaucasus would disrupt its ties with the allies through the Caucasus and Iran, and help to drag Turkey into a war against it.

Based on the tasks set, changes were made to the structure of command and control of troops on the southern wing of the German Eastern Front. Army Group South (Field Marshal F. von Bock) was divided into two: Army Group B (4th Panzer, 2nd and 6th German field armies, and 2nd Hungarian armies; Colonel General M von Weichs) and Army Group "A" (1st Panzer, 17th and 11th German field armies and 8th Italian armies; Field Marshal V. List).

For the offensive in the Stalingrad direction, the 6th Field Army (General of Panzer Troops F. Paulus) was allocated from Army Group B. On July 17, 1942, it consisted of 13 divisions, 3 thousand guns and mortars, and about 500 tanks. It was supported by the aviation of the 4th Air Fleet (up to 1200 aircraft).

The capture of Stalingrad was very important to Hitler for several reasons. It was the main industrial city on the banks of the Volga (a vital transport route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia). Capturing Stalingrad would provide security on the left flank of the German armies advancing into the Caucasus. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin, Hitler's main enemy, made the seizure of the city a winning ideological and propaganda move. Stalin also had ideological and propaganda interests in defending the city that bore his name.

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With the exit of F. Paulus's 6th field army on July 17, the Battle of Stalingrad (defensive period) began on the border of the Chir River. On July 12, the Supreme Command headquarters urgently began to form a new Stalingrad Front on the basis of the South-Western ...

On October 1, 1942, as a result of a counterattack by units of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front, a number of enemy documents were seized, among which was one curious diagram. According to A.I. Eremenko, her “The content ... went far beyond not only the army scale, but even the scale of the army group and concerned, in essence, the entire Soviet-German front. It was a diagram, drawn in pencil on a plain sheet of paper, and graphically representing the Nazis' plan for the summer of 1942 (see diagram 14). In part, the data of this scheme coincided with the corresponding directives of Hitler, now made public. The diagram also indicated the dates, which apparently meant the timing of the seizure of certain points by fascist troops. ".

This scheme, apparently, was transferred to Moscow and on November 6-7, 1942, the whole country learned about its content. Comrade Stalin, in his report on the 25th anniversary of the VOSR, said: “Recently a German officer of the German General Staff fell into the hands of our people. This officer had a map with the designation of the plan for the advance of German troops in terms of time. This document shows that the Germans intended to be in Borisoglebsk on July 10 this year, in Stalingrad on July 25, in Saratov on August 10, in Kuibyshev on August 15, in Arzamas on September 10, and in Baku on September 25.

This document fully confirms our data that the main goal of the summer offensive of the Germans was to bypass Moscow from the east and to strike at Moscow, while the advance to the south was intended, among other things, to divert our reserves away from Moscow and weaken the Moscow front. , so that the easier it would be to strike at Moscow.

In short, the main goal of the German summer offensive was to encircle Moscow and end the war this year. "

From that moment on, all Soviet military historiography, describing German plans for the summer of 42, focused exclusively on this report. Even in secret works like "Collection of materials on the study of the experience of the war No. 6 (April-May 1943)" wrote (p. 9): “On October 1, 1942, on the Stalingrad front in the Sadovoe region, a map with a schematic plan of the enemy's offensive was seized from a killed German officer of the General Staff. This document confirms the forecasts of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army regarding the planning by the Germans of the summer campaign of 1942 (diagram 1) ”.

What can we say about more accessible works (Zamyatin N.M. et al. Battle of Stalingrad. M., 1944; Samsonov A. At the walls of Stalingrad. M., 1952; Telpukhovsky B.S. Great victory of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad. M ., 1953, etc.). The article "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" of the new, second edition of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" (T. 7. P. 172) also presented this version with a colorful map.

Meanwhile, in the West, works began to appear, which described the real German plans for the summer of 1942. Some of them were reviewed in the semi-secret magazine Voennaya Mysl (which was then issued with the stamp “Only for generals, admirals and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy”) and, of course, this moment was declared a falsification. Here, in particular, is an excerpt from the review of the book by B. Liddell Hart "The Other Side of the Hill" (VM. 1950. No. 6. P. 92-93): “Describing the plans of operations for 1942, the author of the book describes them as“ the masterful planning of General Halder ”(p. 63). But these plans, in the author's opinion, failed because Hitler split the forces of the German army, giving it two tasks: to occupy Stalingrad and seize the oil of the Caucasus (p. 208) ... Speaking about the fact that Hitler sought to provide Germany with Caucasian oil, the author tries to deny the fact that the German high command in 1942 pursued the goal of bypassing Moscow, and asserts that the Germans needed Stalingrad only in order “to secure their flank when attacking the Caucasus” (p. 208). However, it has long been known that the main goal of the German offensive in 1942 was to bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and the Urals, and then occupy it. "

Approximately the same was written in the review of the book by Walter Görlitz “The Second World War. 1939-1945 ", published in two volumes in 1951-1952. (VM. 1955. No. 5. P. 92).

But the inertia of the Stalinist report (especially after the death of the speaker himself) could not last forever, and the first bell about the impending revision of views on German plans in 1942 sounded in the same issue of Voennaya Mysl, in which the review of Gorlitz was published. In the article by Colonel-General P. Kurochkin, "The Victory of Soviet Military Art in the Great Patriotic War," in an excerpt about the armed struggle in the summer of 1942, perhaps for the first time the version of the bypass of Moscow was not announced (p. 22): “The summer campaign of 1942 began with an almost simultaneous offensive by the Soviet troops in the Kharkov region, and the German fascist ones in the Crimea, in the Rzhev region and south of Leningrad. The enemy managed in May-June to eliminate our bridgeheads on the Kerch Peninsula and at Sevastopol, to encircle part of the advancing troops near Kharkov. Having achieved these successes, and also taking advantage of the absence of a second front, the Hitlerite command concentrated large forces in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front and launched a new offensive in the southeastern direction. Not having sufficient forces for an offensive in several directions, as was the case in 1941, the enemy was still able to concentrate large forces on one sector of the front and achieve new serious successes. The Soviet Army again found itself compelled to conduct heavy defensive battles against the superior strength of the enemy, now on the Stalingrad and North Caucasian directions. "

However, the final blow was struck by the publication in 1956 of a collection of articles "The most important operations of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." under the editorship of Doctor of History Colonel P.A. Zhilina. In the article "The Battle of Stalingrad" (written by Colonels A. V. Karatyshkin and K. A. Cheremukhin, p. 110) directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942 with the plans of the German command for the upcoming campaign was cited. Moreover, one should not associate the content of the collection with the well-known report of N.S. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU. The imprint of the book shows that it was put in the set on 11.07.55, and signed for printing on 30.01.56.

The magazine "Military Thought" also had a hand in changing the situation. First, in the 10th issue of the magazine for 1956, an article was published by Colonel N. Pavlenko "The Struggle for Strategic Initiative in the Great Patriotic War", which briefly reviewed the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 and the plans of the parties in it. Then, in the next, 11th issue, an article by Colonel-General A. Tarasov "On the question of the plan of the summer campaign of the Hitlerite command on the Soviet-German front in 1942" is printed. Its beginning already sets us in a revealing mood (p. 64): “In our literature, the opinion has been established that the main goal of the offensive of the German-fascist troops on the Soviet-German front in 1942 was Moscow, the seizure of which was also associated with the end of the war in the East. In the works devoted to the Great Patriotic War, in particular, it is argued that the Nazi command sought to achieve the solution of this strategic task by inflicting the main blow in the Stalingrad direction. With access to the Volga and the capture of Stalingrad, the enemy troops allegedly had to develop their attack to the north with the aim of a deep bypass of Moscow from the east, isolation of Moscow from the Volga and Ural rear and subsequent capture of it. The offensive of the enemy in the south towards the Caucasus was viewed as an auxiliary one aimed at diverting the reserves of the Soviet Army from Moscow and thereby weakening the defense of the Moscow direction. Further, the article described the history of the capture of the document (it was specified that it was taken from a Romanian, not a German officer), its content and comparison with both German documents and memoirs, and even Paulus's testimony (p. 69): “In conversation with the author of this article, Paulus stated: “Believe me, until the very day of my surrender to the Soviet troops, I never heard from anyone that the goal of our offensive in 1942, even if distant, was Moscow. I learned about this only in captivity, from Soviet materials, with which I completely disagree. "

Of course, all the historical works touching on this moment could not change instantly. In the same 1956 a brochure “Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) was published. Materials for political studies ”, where an outdated version was presented on page 25. But in the 40th volume of the TSB, published in the same year, the latest data were used in the article "The Battle of Stalingrad 1942-1943".

The last time the Stalinist version in Russian historical works was mentioned in an article by Colonel I. Parotkin "On the plan of the summer campaign of the Nazi command on the Soviet-German front in 1942" (Military History Journal. 1961. No. 1). In addition to a detailed story about the content of the captured document, an image of the diagram was also provided. I will also note that Comrade Parotkin, then still in the rank of lieutenant colonel, was a member of the team of authors of one of the first works on the Battle of Stalingrad - “The Battle of Stalingrad. A short sketch "(Moscow: Military History Department of the General Staff of the KA, 1944).

G.K. Zhukov said that after a search at his dacha and the seizure of documents and materials stored there in the safe in 1946, Stalin called him and said the following: "Are you going to write history? Don't. Let the historians do this when we die.".